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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
THE IMPAIRMENT OF SECURED CREDITORS'
RIGHTS IN REORGANIZATION: A STUDY OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BANKRUPTCY
CLAUSE
James Steven Rogers'lo
Some commentators and courts have argued that the takings
clause of the fifth amendment limits congressional power to inteifere
with property rights in bankruptcy proceedings. In this Article,
Professor Rogers argues to the contrary that, at least with respect
to prospective bankruptcy legislation, the bankruptcy clause itself
and not the fifth amendment limits congressional bankruptcy power.
His view derives from nineteenth and twentieth century case law,
particularly cases assessing the validity of restraints on secured
creditors' foreclosure rights, and from the theoretical difficulty of
distinguishing between supposedly protected property rights and
supposedly unprotected contract interests. Professor Rogers also
sharply criticizes the Supreme Court's analysis in the recently de-
cided Security Industrial Bank case, which concerned the extent to
which fifth amendment principles limit retroactive application of
bankruptcy legislation.
ARTICLE I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that"[t]he Congress shall have Power ... [t]o establish ...
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."! As the concept of bankruptcy is now under-
stood and implemented, 2 this clause confers authority on the
federal government to adopt far-reaching measures to deal
with the problems of insolvent or otherwise financially troubled
individuals and enterprises. Through the exercise of this
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College. University of Pennsylvania, A.B.,
1973; Harvard University, J.D., 1976.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 The currently effective federal bankruptcy law is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at II U.S.C., in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C., and in scattered sections of other titles (Supp. v 1981», which became
generally effective on October I, 1979, for bankruptcy cases commenced on or after
that date, id. §§ 401-403, 92 Stat. at 2682-83. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
is hereinafter referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code." The prior federal bankruptcy
law, that is, those provisions repealed by id. § 401, 92 Stat. at 2682, is referred to as
the "Bankruptcy Act."
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power, the federal government may assume control over the
assets and affairs of a debtor, disregarding all manner of con-
tractual and property rights of creditors and other investors,
and encourage or force the parties interested in the debtor's
affairs to accept in satisfaction of their claims an entirely
different package of rights than that for which they had orig-
inally bargained. Other provisions of the Constitution, how-
ever, appear to limit the power of government to disrupt pri-
vate economic rights: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts";3 "No person shall
. . . be deprived of . . . property, without due process of
law";4 "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."5
Because exercise of the bankruptcy power substantially im-
pairs private property and contract rights, some accommoda-
tion must be reached between the affirmative grant of power
in the bankruptcy clause and the limitations found in the fifth
amendment and related provisions. It is the purpose of this
Article to consider how these constitutional provisions can be
reconciled. Although the subject is, at the most general level,
the relationship between the bankruptcy clause and the fifth
amendment, much of the discussion centers on a narrower
issue - the source and nature of constitutional limits on im-
pairment of secured creditors' rights during the pendency of
reorganization proceedings. 6 The reason for this focus is that
the problem of interim restraint of secured creditors' rights is
perhaps the only issue concerning the constitutional limits of
the bankruptcy power that has received much attention in
recent times. 7 Part I of this Article presents and criticizes the
3 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 10. For a discussion of the application of contracts clause
principles to federal legislation, see infra pp. 989--91.
4 U.S. CaNST. amend. V.
s [d.
6 Problems concerning secured creditors' rights to reclaim collateral from debtors
involved in bankruptcy proceedings are most acute in reorganization proceedings
rather than in liquidation or "straight" bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the
discussion in this Article focuses on reorganization proceedings, although the conclu-
sions reached concerning the extent to which the Constitution restricts Congress' ability
to impair secured creditors' rights apply equally to straight bankruptcy cases in which
secured creditors' foreclosure rights might be restrained.
By "reorganization," I mean proceedings under chapters II and 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, II U.S.C. §§ IIOl-II74, 1301-1330 (Supp. V 1981), and similar pro-
visions of prior law, including chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act
as it existed before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and §§ 77 and 77B of
earlier versions of the Bankruptcy Act.
7 The literature on the treatment of secured creditors' rights in reorganization is
extensive. For case citations, see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 362.01 (L. King 15th
ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 3.32 (J.
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currently dominant model of constitutional constraints on
bankruptcy legislation, a model under which fifth amendment
principles limit the substantive scope of the bankruptcy power.
Part II develops a different and more satisfactory model under
which the sole source of substantive limits on the bankruptcy
power is the bankruptcy clause itself. Part ill considers
whether special constitutional problems are presented by retro-
active bankruptcy legislation.
Before beginning the analysis, a basic understanding of
reorganization is required. The central assumption of the re-
organization provisions of federal bankruptcy law is that the
value of an enterprise as a going concern will often exceed the
liquidation value of the enterprise's assets.8 Reorganization
proceedings are designed to preserve this going concern surplus
for the benefit of the enterprise's creditors and investors by
providing a breathing spell during which the enterprise may
assess its affairs, effect economies in its operations, and at-
tempt to reorder its financial structure free from the necessity
of dealing with the immediate demands of its creditors. 9
In nearly all cases, the debtor's business operations must
be continued for the reorganization effort to succeed, and con-
tinued operations may require that the debtorlO be permitted
Moore 14th ed. 1978) (discussing chapter X of Bankruptcy Act); 8 id. 113.22 (discussing
chapter XI of Bankruptcy Act); sources cited infra. The commentary includes the
following: Coogan, Broude & Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of
the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30 Bus. LAW. II49 (1975); Countryman, Real Estate
Liem in Business Reorganization Cases, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 303 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Countryman 1]; Countryman, Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter Cases,
82 COM. L.J. 349 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Countryman II]; Murphy, Restraint and
Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in Reorganization and Arrangement Proceed-
ings, 30 Bus. LAW. IS (1974) [hereinafter cited as Murphy 1]; Murphy, Use of
Collateral in Business Rehabilitations: A Suggested Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the
Bankruptcy Refoml Act, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 1483 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Murphy
II]; Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate Reorganization and the Secured
Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123 V. PA. L. REv. 509 (1975); Webster, Collateral
Control Decisions in Chapter Cases: Clear Rules v. Judicial Discretion, 51 AM.
BANKR. L.]. 197 (1977); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power:
Chapter XII Real Property Arrangements, 52 N.Y.V. L. REv. 362 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y.V. Note]; Comment, The Secured Creditor's Right to Full Liquidation
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 42 V. CHI. L. REv. 510 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Chicago Comment]; Note, Conrail and Liquidation Value: Creditors' and Stock-
holders' Entitlement in the Regional Rail Reorganization, 85 YALE L.J. 371 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Yale Note II]; Note, Takings and the Public Interest in Railroad
Reorganization, 82 YALE L.J. 1004 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note I].
3 See H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 V.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179.
9 See id.
10 For convenience, this Article refers to the entity operating the business during
reorganization as "the debtor" rather than a more precise but cumbersome phrase
such as "debtor in possession or trustee."
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to use property in which creditors hold security interests. The
secured creditors, however, will undoubtedly have the right
by virtue of their agreements with the debtor and the relevant
state law to seize the collateral securing their claims and sell
it off to satisfy the debts secured. In cases in which accom-
modation between the debtor and the secured creditors cannot
be reached by negotiation, the reorganization court will need
to decide whether to restrain the secured creditor from exer-
cising his rights against the collateral during the pendency of
the proceedings. l1 A restraint, of course, will subject the se-
cured creditor to the risk that, if the reorganization effort fails
and if the value of the collateral has declined during the
pendency of the proceedings, he may find himself in a worse
position than he would have occupied had he been allowed to
exercise his rights at the outset. 12
11 Similar issues are presented when the debtor seeks a turnover order requiring
a secured creditor to turn over collateral in the creditor's possession for use in the
operations of the debtor during reorganization, see Bankruptcy Code §§ 362, 542, II
U.S.C. §§ 362, 542 (Supp. V 1981), or when the debtor seeks authority to issue
certificates of indebtedness secured by liens with priority over existing security inter-
ests, see id. § 364, II U.S.C. § 364. For discussion of such issues in the context of
turnover orders, see In re Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952);
Coogan, Broude & Glatt, supra note 7, at II69-78; Countryman I, supra note 7, at
316-20; Countryman II, supra note 7, at 351-54; for a discussion of the issues in the
context of certificates of indebtedness, see Baker, Certificates of Indebtedness in
Reorganization Proceedings: Analysis and Legislative Proposals, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J.
1 (1976).
12 A reorganization court would, however, authorize such an impairment of secured
creditors' rights only if persuaded that a successful reorganization were likely. In the
event of a successful reorganization, the secured creditor can be given a package of
cash and securities equal in value to the amount of its secured claim at the inception
of the proceedings, see In re Yale Express Sys., 384 F.2d 990, 992 (2d Cir. 1967), in
which event the secured creditor would not have been harmed by the order in
question. Even if the effort to reorganize fails, the secured creditor can be granted
some measure of protection by giving him a priority claim for the amount of any
reduction in the value of the collateral. See id.
By successful reorganization, I mean simply the consummation of a plan of reor-
ganization providing at least for the payment of the claims of secured creditors in
accordance with the applicable requirements of federal bankruptcy law. In general,
a plan may be approved, at least over the objections of creditors, only if it complies
with the "absolute priority rule." Very roughly, the absolute priority rule requires
that, before any distribution to junior claimants is permissible, a plan of reorganization
must give secured creditors a package of cash and securities of the reorganized
company having a value equal to the value of the secured creditors' claims against
the property of the debtor. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S.
510,520-21 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, II6 (1939);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913). For discussion of the extent
to which the Bankruptcy Code has incorporated the requirements of the absolute
priority rule, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted To Know About Cram Down Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979)·
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1. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IMPAIRMENT THESIS
Perhaps more by dint of repetition than by analysis, it
seems to have become an accepted proposition of reorganiza-
tion law that the fifth amendment limits the extent to which
secured creditors may be subjected to the risk of loss due to
restraint of their foreclosure rights. Virtually every discussion
of the problem includes a reference to Justice Brandeis' state-
ment in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford that
"[t]he bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive pow-
ers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment." 13 The
theory that the fifth amendment places substantive limits on
the ability of the government to restrain secured creditors'
rights in reorganization has crystallized into the following
proposition: any impairment of the liquidation value of a se-
cured creditor's collateral attributable to the exercise of powers
conferred on the reorganization court by bankruptcy legislation
is, in the absence of just compensation, a violation of the
takings clause of the fifth amendment. 14 For convenience, this
proposition is referred to in this Article as the Unconstitutional
Impairment Thesis.
Although the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis evolved
at a time when the text of the bankruptcy statutes provided
very little guidance on the permissibility of restraining secured
13 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) (footnote omitted).
14 Judge Cyr's comments in In re American Kitchen Foods, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 715 (Bankr. D. Me. June 8, 1976), are typical:
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees protec-
tion against any taking of private property even for a wholly public use without
just compensation. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555, 602 (1935). The peripheral scope of the just compensation clause encom-
passes collateral impairments resulting from government restraints upon the
exercise of contract rights acquired by a secured creditor in specific property
of its debtor. Id. No material impairment of collateral is constitutionally
permissible, either within or without bankruptcy proceedings, in the absence
of just compensation.
. . . No unconstitutional impairment is occasioned where the value recov-
erable from the collateral remains sufficient to satisfy the indebtedness secured.
Wright v. Union Central Insurance Co., 3II U.S. 273, 278 (1940). Similarly,
where the stay complained of has resulted in no diminution, no collateral
impairment can have occurred and no constitutional issue is posed.
Id. at 719 (citations and footnote omitted).
For convenience, I refer to the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis as a require-
ment that the value of the collateral be preserved, though to be more precise, one
should speak of a requirement of preserving the value of the secured party's interest
in the collateral. Thus, even under the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis, no
constitutional issue would be presented by diminution in the value of collateral held
by an oversecured creditor as long as the value of the collateral remained in excess
of the amount of the debt. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 7, 11 362.01, at 362-15.
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creditors' rights,15 the widespread acceptance of the Thesis
seems to have had a substantial impact on the evolution of
the present statutory law of reorganization. The new Bank-
ruptcy Code contains detailed provisions specifying the extent
to which impairment of secured creditors' rights is permissible
during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings, the key being
the concept of adequate protection. 16 Although the term "ad-
equate protection" is not defined, section 361 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code contains a nonexclusive list of possible techniques
for providing adequate protection. For example, as compen-
sation for any depreciation in the value of collateral that may
result from a given order, a secured creditor can be granted
either a substitute lien on other property of the debtor or
periodic cash payments. 17 Section 361(3), however, explicitly
states that it is not sufficient simply to give secured creditors
an unsecured claim having priority as an expense of adminis-
tration as compensation for the amount of any loss in the value
of their collateral. 18 Thus, under the adequate protection pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Code, a secured creditor cannot be
forced to rely solely on the court's assessment that the debtor's
earning power will be adequate to ensure repayment of the
debt even if the collateral depreciates or is dissipated. Rather,
any risk of loss occasioned by diminution of the value of the
collateral during the pendency of the proceedings must be
eliminated by giving the secured creditor substitute collateral
or its equivalent in cash. The adequate protection model,
therefore, precisely mirrors the supposed constitutional require-
ments of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis. 19
If, as this Article argues, the Unconstitutional Impairment
Thesis is entirely unsound, a major aspect of the new Bank-
ruptcy Code's treatment of reorganization problems may be
based, to some extent, on a foundation of sand. Given that
the present statutory law of reorganization has largely incor-
porated the supposed requirements of the Unconstitutional Im-
pairment Thesis, rejection of the Thesis may not have major
IS For discussion of the relevant problems of statutory interpretation under the
oid Bankruptcy Act, see Countryman I, supra note 7; Murphy I, supra note 7, at 27-
45; Webster, supra note 7.
16 Bankruptcy Code §§ 361-364, II U.S.C. §§ 361-364 (Supp. V 1981).
17 [d. § 361, II U.S.C § 36r.
18 [d. § 361(3), II U.S.C. § 361(3).
19 Indeed, the legislative history makes it quite clear that the adequate-protection
model is derived, at least in part, from what Congress assumed to be a constitutional
requirement concerning the protection of secured creditors' property interests. See S.
REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5835; H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 8, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6295.
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immediate impact. Yet unless the flaws of the Thesis are
exposed, many possible proposals for amending the present
reorganization provisions will be doomed from the outset by
the assumption that the proper treatment of secured creditors'
rights in reorganization is dictated by constitutional require-
ments rather than by policy considerations that are within the
discretion of, Congress.
A. Precedent for the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis
I. The Frazier-Lemke Act Cases. - The principal source
of authority for the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis is a
series of Supreme Court decisions involving amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act that were enacted by the Frazier-Lemke
Act of 1934.20 The Frazier-Lemke Act, which applied only to
debts existing at the time of its enactment,21 was designed to
assist farmers who faced the prospect of losing their farms
through mortgage foreclosure. The Act affected mortgagees in
two major respects. First, it enabled the debtor to obtain a
stay of foreclosure proceedings for a period of five years, dur-
ing which time the debtor was to remain in possession, paying
rent in an amount fixed by the court for distribution among
the secured and unsecured creditors as their interests ap-
peared. 22 Second, at any time during the five-year period, the
debtor could acquire full title to the mortgaged real estate by
paying the mortgagee the appraised value of the real estate. 23
The practical effect of the latter provision was that the mort-
gagee might be deprived of the right to conduct a foreclosure
sale at which he could bid in the amount of his debt and
thereby obtain full title to the property in the hope that future
increases in its value might enable him more fully to obtain
repayment of his claim.
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,24 the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice
Brandeis, held the Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional. Al-
though the precise basis of the ruling is not entirely clear, the
case has been widely interpreted to hold that the Frazier-
Lemke Act violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment
by taking from a mortgagee without compensation rights that
20 Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289. The Frazier-Lemke Act amended the
Bankruptcy Act by adding subsection (5) to § 75. ld. The Act expired on March 1,
1949. See Act of Apr. 21, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-495, 62 Stat. 198.
21 Pub. L. No. 73-486, § 75(5)(7), 48 Stat. 1289, 1291.
22 ld.
231d.
24 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
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he otherwise would have had to the mortgaged premises. 25 In
response to the Radford decision, Congress amended the Fra-
zier-Lemke Act. 26 Two years after Radford, the Supreme
Court upheld the rev~sed Act in Wright v. Vinton Branch of
the Mountain Trust Bank,27 another unanimous opinion by
Justice Brandeis.
It is by no means easy to discern the principle that enabled
Justice Brandeis to conclude that the changes made by Con-
gress in response to Radford sufficed to overcome the consti-
tutional objections found fatal in that case. Congress' changes
in the two key provisions of the Act were, in fact, rather
insubstantial. First, with respect to the stay imposed by the
original Act, the revised Act simply shortened the period of
the stay from five to three years. 28 It is true that in Vinton
Branch Justice Brandeis read the revised Act to provide that
the stay could be terminated if it appeared that the debtor
would be unable to rehabilitate himself within the three-year
period,29 but on this point Vinton Branch was expressly re-
pudiated by the Court two years later in John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels.3D Second, as it was ultimately
interpreted, the revised Act did not change significantly the
provision denying the mortgagee the right to acquire the prop-
erty through a judicial sale. Although in Vinton Branch Jus-
tice Brandeis interpreted the revised Act to direct that a ju-
dicial sale be held if the debtor failed to pay rent or comply
25 See, e.g., Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d II93, 1197-98 (lOth Cir.
1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982);
In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 278 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
883 (1974); Murphy I, supra note 7, at 22-23; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 7, at 384-85;
Chicago Comment, supra note 7, at 515-19; Yale Note I, supra note 7, at 1012.
The concluding language of Justice Brandeis' opinion offers some support for this
reading:
The province of the Court is limited to deciding whether the Fra2ier-
Lemke Act as applied has taken from the Bank without compensation, and
given to Radford, rights in specific property which are of substantial value.
As we conclude that the Act as applied has done so, we must hold it void.
For the Fifth Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's need,
private property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use withoutjust compensation. If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of
property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual
mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that,
through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may
be borne by the public.
295 U.S. at 601-02 (citations omitted).
26 Act of Aug. 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 942.
27 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
28 Pub. L. No. 74-384, § 75(s)(2), 49 Stat. 942, 944.
29 300 U.S. at 462.
30 308 U.S. 180, 184 & n.3 (1939).
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with other court orders,31 three years later, in Wright v. Union
Central Insurance Co., the Court ruled that even in such
circumstances the statute gave the debtor the opportunity to
redeem the property for its appraised value before a judicial
sale could be conducted.32
2. Relevance of the Frazier-Lemke Act Cases to the Uncon-
stitutional Impairment Thesis. - The most plausible expla-
nation of the irreconcilability of Radford and the subsequent
Frazier-Lemke Act cases is that the later cases overrule or
substantially undercut the vitality of Radford.33 Courts and
commentators, however, have often stated that the subsequent
Frazier-Lemke Act cases only refined the principles developed
in Radford34 and that certain dicta in Union Central express
the determinative principle - that the mortgagee is constitu-
tionally entitled to have the value of the property preserved
and devoted to the payment of his debt. On this view, the
reason that the revised Act was upheld is that it preserved to
the mortgagee this constitutional minimum. Thus, Patrick
Murphy, an authority on reorganization law, reads Union Cen-
tral to have established that "the secured creditor has a distinct
property interest which is entitled to constitutional protection
throughout the proceeding" and that the core of this protected
property interest is the right to have the value of the collateral
preserved. 35 Similarly, the most recent edition of the Collier
treatise reviews the Frazier-Lemke Act cases and concludes
that Union Central contains "the clearest statement of a right
of a secured creditor, namely, to have the value of its secured
position maintained throughout the proceedings."36 The Fra-
zier-Lemke Act cases, that is, are taken to establish the validity
of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis.
Even if Radford survives the subsequent Frazier-Lemke
Act cases, it is difficult to see how the Frazier-Lemke Act cases
support the position of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis
31 Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. at 461-62.
32 3II U.S. 273, 278-79 (1940).
33 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself once admitted that it may have fallen into
error in Radford and corrected itself in Vinton Branch. See Helvering v. Griffiths,
318 U.S. 371, 400-01 & n·52 (1943).
34 See, e.g., Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d II93, II97-98 (lOth Cir.
1981), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982);
Murphy I, supra note 7, at 22-26; Murphy II, supra note 7, at 1491; Chicago
Comment, supra note 7, at 515-19. Professor Countryman seems to stand alone in
urging that Radford never made much sense and, in any event, that it died with
Vinton Branch. See Countryman I, supra note 7, at 335-36; Countryman II, supra
note 7, at 357-60.
35 Murphy II, supra note 7, at 1491; accord Murphy I, supra note 7, at 22-26.
36 2 COLLIER, supra note 7, ~ 362.01, at 362-15.
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that preservation of the value of collateral is the key consti-
tutional right of the secured creditor. The literature contains
several suggestions of the ways in which the original Frazier-
Lemke Act may have failed to provide protection against pos-
sible depreciation in the value of the mortgagee's interest in
the property; none of these possibilities, however, appears to
have played any significant role in the Frazier-Lemke Act
cases. Some interpreters of Radford have suggested, for ex-
ample, that the basis of the ruling was that the mortgagee was
not protected against erosion of his position due to the possible
accumulation of tax liens having priority over the mortgage. 37
Yet in Radford the parties stipulated that the annual charges
for taxes and insurance were $105, and the rental fixed by the
court was $325 during the first year. 38 Although the original
Act did not explicitly provide that taxes were to be paid from
the rentals, the court of appeals assumed that such payment
was contemplated,39 and nothing in Justice Brandeis' opinion
suggests the contrary. Even if there were serious dispute on
this question, or even if the rental had been fixed at a level
inadequate to pay taxes or other prior charges as they accrued,
it strains credulity to suppose that Justice Brandeis would have
held an act of Congress unconstitutional on such grounds in
the face of the obvious alternative of interpreting the statute
to require that rentals be fixed at a level adequate to pay taxes
and be so applied. Mter all, it was Justice Brandeis who, less
than a year after the Radford decision, delivered the well-
known dissertation on the virtues of avoiding unnecessary con-
stitutional decisions in his Ashwander concurrence. 40
Others who read Radford to have established the Uncon-
stitutional Impairment Thesis suggest that the constitutional
vice of the Frazier-Lemke Act was the possibility that the
collateral might decline in value during the period of the stay. 41
Yet there was essentially no discussion of this point in Radford,
and there appears to have been no evidence before the Su-
preme Court in Radford suggesting that any depreciation in
the value of the collateral was likely. Furthermore, with re-
spect to the possibility of decline in the value of the collateral,
the Frazier-Lemke Act was indistinguishable from the Min-
37 See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 494 F.2d 270, 288 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
38 Radford, 295 U.S. at 577-78.
39 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 74 F.2d 576, 583 (6th Cir.), rev'd,
295 U.S. 555 (1935)·
40 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (I936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
41 See, e.g., Chicago Comment, supra note 7, at 5I7.
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nesota Mortgage Moratorium Act, which had been upheld by
the Court only a year before in Home Building & Loan As-
sociation v. Blaisdell.42 One would hardly expect that Con-
gress' explicitly granted power to deal with problems of finan-
cially troubled debtors is restricted by fifth amendment
principles in a more rigorous fashion than the general police
powers of the states to deal with similar matters are restricted
by fourteenth amendment or contracts clause principles.43
Commentators who read the Frazier-Lemke Act cases to
have established the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis44
seem to rely primarily on the Union Central opinion, in which
Justice Douglas, in the course of describing the revised Act,
stated that "[s]afeguards were provided to protect the rights of
secured creditors, throughout the proceedings, to the extent of
the value of the property"4S and that "[t]here is no constitu-
tional claim of the creditor to more than that. "46 Although
Justice Douglas' comments are consistent with the proposition
that a secured creditor is constitutionally entitled to have the
liquidation value of the collateral preserved, there is little
reason to suppose that Justice Douglas had such a proposition
in mind. His comments concerning the safeguards provided
to protect the mortgage were made in the course of ruling, as
a matter of statutory interpretation, that even a debtor who
failed to pay rent required by order of the court was entitled
to the opportunity to buy the property at its appraised value.
Thus, the most plausible interpretation of his comments in
Union Central is that Justice Douglas was not addressing the
notion that preservation of the value of collateral is a consti-
tutional requirement, but instead was rejecting the suggestion
42 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Act of Apr. 18, 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws ch.
339)·
43 Cf. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, SIS (1938) (upholding,
on authority of Blaisdell, constitutionality of a provision of the Frazier-Lemke Act
providing for an extension of the period for redemption of foreclosed mortgages).
It is true that the revised Act upheld in Vinton Branch and Union Central
contained a provision, not included in the original Act, authorizing courts to require
mortgagors to make payments of principal in addition to rent if such payments were
necessary to preserve security. Pub. L. No. 74-384, § 7S(S)(3), 49 Stat. 942, 944. An
adherent of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis might argue that this provision
was the change that saved the revised Act, for by requiring payments of principal, a
court might protect a secured creditor from loss caused by diminution in the value of
the collateral. Yet given the absence of any suggestion in Radford that the possibility
of depreciation was the significant constitutional flaw in the original Act, there is little
reason to suppose that this amendment was the saving grace in the revised Act.
44 See, e.g., 2 COLLIER, supra note 7, 11 362.01, at 362-15; Murphy II, supra note
7, at 1491.
4S 3II U.S. at 278.
46Id.
984 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:973
in Radford and Vinton Branch that the mortgagee is consti-
tutionally entitled to the opportunity of obtaining title to the
property itself by bidding in the amount of his debt at a
foreclosure sale.
The most fundamental flaw in the suggestion that Radford
supports the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis is the irrel-
evancy of that case to the central assertion of the Thesis, that
the fifth amendment imposes definite constitutional limitations
on the substance of bankruptcy legislation. It seems to be
thought that fifth amendment principles derived from Radford
impose generally applicable limits on the substantive scope of
bankruptcy power of a sort that would apply even to purely
prospective bankruptcy legislation. For example, during the
lengthy legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
the new Bankruptcy Code, numerous commentators seriously
considered whether the proposed bills' treatment of secured
claims comported with the requirements of the fifth amend-
ment, yet nothing in this literature suggests that these com-
mentators saw the problem as one limited to security interests
in existence at the time the proposed legislation was to be
enacted. 47 Congress appears to have shared this conception.
The House and Senate reports on the adequate protection
provisions of the bills, citing Radford and Union Central, state
that the concept of adequate protection is derived from the
requirements of the fifth amendment.48 The reports lack any
indication that the constitutional issue was seen to be limited
to problems of retroactivity. Similarly, in cases decided before
the enactment of the new Bankruptcy Code that discuss the
Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis, the theory must have
been that the vague language of the old Bankruptcy Act could
not be interpreted to confer power to impair secured creditors'
rights in a fashion inconsistent with the Unconstitutional Im-
pairment Thesis, because Congress would have lacked power
to adopt such a statute explicitly.
Radford and its progeny, however, provide no support at
all for the assertion of such a broad substantive limit on the
powers of Congress under the bankruptcy clause. If we are
to make any sense out of Radford, we need to note the precise
point in the opinion at which Justice Brandeis made the fa-
mous statement that the bankruptcy power is subject to the
47 See Coogan, Braude & Glatt, supra note 7, at II68-76; Reisman, The Challenge
of the Proposed Bankruptcy Act to Accounts Receivable and Inventory Financing of
Small-to-Medium-Sized Business (pts. I & 2), 83 COM. L.J. 169, 172 nn.I4 & 21,
2II, 218 (1978); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 536-37.
48 See supra note 19.
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fifth amendment.49 Immediately before this statement, Justice
Brandeis was discussing the mortgagee's contention that Con-
gress lacks power to "attempt, by a bankruptcy act, to abridge,
solely in the interest of the mortgagor, a substantive right of
the mortgagee in specific property held as security."50 Justice
Brandeis stated, however, that "we have no occasion to decide
[that issue] in this case."51 He then noted that the Frazier-
Lemke Act applied only to preexisting mortgages, and stated
that, "[b]ecause the Act is retroactive in terms and as here
applied purports to take away rights of the mortgagee in spe-
cific property, another provision of the Constitution is con-
trolling."52 Then comes the statement that the bankruptcy
power is subject to the fifth amendment. 53
In context, Justice Brandeis' comments suggest that the
holding of the case is only that the modification of secured
creditors' rights effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act was too
substantial to permit the Act to be applied retroactively. 54
Thus, the famous statement that the bankruptcy power is
subject to the fifth amendment must be taken to mean nothing
more than that the fifth amendment, through either the due
process or the takings clause, is the constitutional foundation
for the proposition that statutes that retroactively disrupt set-
tled expectations may be subject to particularly attentive ju-
dicial scrutiny.55 Hence, even if Radford's specific application
of retroactivity concepts survived the subsequent Frazier-
Lemke Act cases, and even if those cases could be read to
support the notion that preservation of the value of a secured
creditor's collateral is a matter of constitutional significance in
the context of retroactive application of statutes, none of the
Frazier-Lemke Act cases provides any support whatsoever for
the proposition that fifth amendment property-protection con.:
cepts limit the substantive scope of the bankruptcy power.
49 295 U.S. at 589.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 The decisions upholding the revised Fra2ier-Lemke Act, Vinton Branch and
Union Central, IJ;Iight then be explained on the ground that, even though both cases
involved retroactive application of the Act to preexisting mortgages, see Union Cen-
tral, 3II U.S. at 275 (referring to earlier decision in Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 304 U.S. 502, 504-05 (1938), for statement of facts); Vinton Branch, 300 U.S.
at 454, the revised Act effected a less extensive modification of the mortgagees' rights
than did the original Act. Given the relatively minor nature of the changes made by
the revised Act, however, it is probably more realistic to view the revised Act cases
to have essentially overruled Radford's particular application of fifth amendment
retroactivity principles.
55 See infra Part ill.
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B. Theoretical Flaws in the Unconstitutional Impairment
Thesis
Lack of support for the Unconstitutional Impairment The-
sis in the Frazier-Lemke Act cases does not, in itself, demon-
strate that the Thesis is invalid. It is necessary, therefore, to
consider whether there is any independent theoretical support
for the Thesis. There are two constitutional provisions that
appear to be plausible candidates as textual support for the
notion that the bankruptcy power is limited by the requirement
of nonimpairment of secured creditors' property rights: the due
process clause and the takings clause. The due process clause
is, today, hardly an appealing candidate. The contention that
the due process clause is the source of the Unconstitutional
Impairment Thesis reduces to the claim that rather freewheel-
ing Lochner-style56 economic substantive due process should
be revived. In light of the glee with which the Supreme Court
seizes every available opportunity to repudiate Lochner yet
again,57 few are likely to pursue that route. Accordingly, ad-
herents of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis seem to rely
on the takings clause. That avenue, however, proves on care-
ful examination to be no less troublesome.
I. Retroactivity, Prospectivity, and the Takings Clause. -
Much of the intuitive appeal of the Unconstitutional Impair-
ment Thesis probably is traceable to the assumption that the
decision made by a reorganization court during bankruptcy
proceedings is the "taking" of which the secured creditor com-
plains. Before initiation of reorganization proceedings, the
secured creditor had the right to seize the collateral upon the
debtor's default. Once the debtor has entered reorganization
proceedings, however, the court may refuse to permit the cred-
itor to exercise his foreclosure right, and may instead allow
the debtor to use the property during the course of the reor-
ganization. Thus, it seems only natural to describe what has
happened as a taking by the government (in the person of the
bankruptcy court) of the secured creditor's property (the col-
lateral) for public use (pursuit of the public policy of promoting
reorganization) without any compensation for possible losses.
The appeal of this view is entirely illusory. Except in
situations in which an amendment to bankruptcy law is ap-
plied retroactively - that is, to a secured financing arrange-
56 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U..S. 45 (1905).
57 See, e.g., Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Co., 412 U.S. 543, 545 (1973)
(quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1952»; Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-32 (1963).
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ment entered into before adoption of the amendment58 - all
that happens when a reorganization court stays a secured cred-
itor from foreclosing on his collateral is that the court applies
a preexisting rule of law to a specific case. What, one may
ask, has been "taken" from the secured creditor? At the time
he entered into the security arrangement, he knew or should
have known that his rights were circumscribed by the federal
legislation. If his property rights are defined by reference to
existing law, obviously no taking has occurred. Thus, the
proposition that the fifth amendment imposes limitations on
even purely prospective restrictions of the rights of secured
creditors seems to assume that the property rights held by
secured creditors are in some sense anterior to positive law.
The implications of that concept are staggering. Obviously the
numerous provisions of state and federal law that restrict a
creditor's ability to obtain an enforceable security interest can-
not all be unconstitutional as takings of private property with-
out just compensation. Yet the effort to determine which
rights are the natural entitlement of secured creditors is a task
that strikes the modern legal mind as futile if not simply
incomprehensible. 59
58 The matter of constitutional limits on retroactive application of newly enacted
bankruptcy legislation is discussed in infra Part ill.
59 In the context of unsecured creditors' rights, the notion that the contracts clause
might restrict prospective legislation was rejected long ago. In 1819, the Supreme
Court held in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), that a state
insolvency law that provided for the discharge of debts incurred prior to the enactment
of the statute violated the contracts clause. Eight years later, however, in Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 WheaL) 213 (1827), the Court ruled that, because the obligations
of contracts are defined and limited by positive state law, no constitutional problem
is presented by prospective insolvency acts. To be sure, Sturges and Ogden involved
the rights of unsecured creditors. As is discussed below, however, see infra pp. 988-
95, there is little reason to believe that the constitutional rights of secured creditors
in bankruptcy are substantially different from those of unsecured creditors. In any
event, the logical problems presented by the suggestion that purely prospective leg-
islation may violate the takings clause are exactly the same as those involved in the
contracts clause setting in Ogden.
I am inclined to suggest that no takings clause issue can ever be presented by a
truly prospective statute. One might object that such a thesis would mean that the
government could entirely avoid the just compensation requirement by simply an-
nouncing in advance, for e.,ample, that all interests in real property were thereafter
held subject to the government's right to take land without compensation for schools,
roads, fire stations, and the like. On the other hand, most takings clause cases involve
real estate, and given the old saw of real estate brokers that "they're not making it
anymore," it is hard to imagine how legislation restricting the use of land could ever
be truly prospective. As soon as the government announced that a certain use of
land would henceforth be prohibited or that certain land might be taken without
compensation at some time in the future, the value of the affected land would be
diminished, to the detriment of its current owner. There can be no new land; there
can, however, be new security arrangements.
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Alternatively, an adherent of the Unconstitutional Impair-
ment Thesis might resort to notions of federalism to explain
the way in which a prospective federal statute can amount to
a taking. The argument would be that, although prospective
state legislation raises no takings problems, prospective federal
legislation may not impair state-created property rights absent
just compensation. This theory, however, is wholly unsatis-
factory, for it assumes that the takings clause restricts federal
legislation more severely than it does state legislation. Nothing
in the case law or commentary on the takings clause supports
such a view. The takings clause does far more than restrict
federal legislation impairing property rights defined by state
law. At least since the r896 case of Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad v. Chicago,60 it has been clear that the tak-
ings clause requirements are applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Thus, the just compensation re-
quirement embodies a limitation on the power of government
generally and not a limitation on the powers of the federal
government with respect to state-created property rights.
Although the rather thorny problems posed by the notion
that fifth amendment principles limit even prospective bank-
ruptcy legislation probably suffice to dispose of the Unconsti-
tutional Impairment Thesis, it may be appropriate to consider
other theoretical flaws in the Thesis. 61
2. The Distinction Between Secured and Unsecured Cred-
itors. - The Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis cannot be
maintained without drawing a sharp distinction between the
60 r66 u.s. 226 (r896).
61 There may be reason to feel slightly reluctant about using the implausibility
of the notion of a prospective taking as the sole basis for rejecting suggestions that
fifth amendment concepts limit the substantive scope of governmental powers. First,
the distinction between retroactive and prospective legislation is not entirely clear-cut.
Legislation prohibiting child labor, for example, is prospective in the sense that it
regulates employment relationships only from the date of its enactment, but is retro-
active to the extent that it may invalidate prior employment contracts or, more
broadly, to the extent that it may reduce the value of business enterprises that had
been established on the assumption that child labor would be permitted. Thus,
whether a legislative measure is taken to effect a retroactive impairment of settled
expectations depends on the breadth of one's conception of the relevant expectations.
Second, one must be a bit careful with the notion that constitutional problems con-
cerning the disruption of property or contract rights can be avoided by defining the
rights solely by reference to existing positive law; pushed to the extreme, such a theory
would enable government to announce, as a postulate of the positive law, that all
rules are subject to change, and would thereby render nugatory any constitutional
provision protecting expectations of property or contract rights. See L. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-6, at 468-69 (r978). The limited concept of the
prospective-retroactive distinction needed to refute the Unconstitutional Impairment
Thesis does not, however, seem to come even close to presenting such problems.
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constitutional rights of secured creditors and those of unse-
cured creditors. 62 Exercise of the bankruptcy power clearly
entails substantial impairments of the rights of unsecured cred-
itors, the clearest instance being the grant of a discharge to
the debtor. The constitutionality of such impairments of un-
secured creditors' rights, however, has long been settled.63
Thus, unless some substantial basis exists for distinguishing
the constitutional rights of secured creditors from those of
unsecured creditors, the ready acceptance of impairments of
unsecured creditors' rights in bankruptcy must cast grave
doubt on the validity of the Unconstitutional Impairment The-
sis.
Although unsecured creditors' rights against the debtor are
generally described as contractual rights, this characterization
alone cannot explain why impairment of unsecured creditors'
rights in bankruptcy has not been viewed to pose substantial
constitutional problems. First, the Supreme Court on a num-
ber of occasions has explicitly stated that contractual rights
are a species of property protected by the due process and
takings clauses. 64 Second, modern developments in the area
of procedural due process protections of entitlements to gov-
ernment benefits and employment65 are hardly consistent with
62 Moreover, the Thesis is not even consistent in its solicitude for the rights of
creditors holding liens against property of the debtor. As Professor Countryman has
noted, see Countryman I, supra note 7, at 335, the proposition that secured creditors
are constitutionally entitled to receive the fulI value of their colIateral is hard to square
with the numerous provisions of bankruptcy law that declare various sorts of liens
unenforceable. Enforceable state-created property rights of creditors in specific prop-
erty of the debtor are routinely "taken" by the operation of provisions of the bank-
ruptcy law dealing with preferential transfers, fraudulent conveyances, judicial liens,
ta.'\: liens, landlord liens, and the like. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 545, 547-548, 724,
II U.S.C. §§ 545, 547-548, 724 (Supp. v X98x). Courts have routinely rejected the
suggestion that such impairments of otherwise valid liens are unconstitutional. See,
e.g., In re Jay & Dee Store Co., 37 F. Supp. 989, 99x (E.D. Pa. X94X) (landlord's
lien); In re Glover Casket Co., x F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Ga. x932) (ta.'\: lien); In re
Rhoads, 98 F. 399, 402 (\V.D. Pa. x899) (judicial liens); cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Staake,
202 U.S. X4X, X48 (X906) (whether state-created judicial liens should be enforced in
bankruptcy is a matter committed to Congress' discretion); Egyptian Supply Co. v.
Boyd, II7 F.2d 608, 6II (6th Cir. X94X) (same).
63 E.g., Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, x86 U.S. x8x, x88 (X902); In re Klein,
x4 F. Cas. 7x6 (C.C.D. Mo. x843) (No. 7865).
64 E.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 43X U.S. x, X9 n.x6 (X977) (takings
clause); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 57x, 579 (X934) ("The Fifth Amendment
commands that property not be taken without making just compensation. Valid
contracts are property .... [T]he due process clause prevents the United States from
annulling them ...."); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 7x8-X9 (x879) (due process
clause).
65 E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 34x, 344 (X976) ("A property interest in
employment can, of course, be created by ordinance or an implied contract."); Perry
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a narrow interpretation of the fifth amendment that would
exclude contractual rights from the scope of the term "prop-
erty." Moreover, although the contracts clause66 is by its terms
applicable only to the states, commentators have often noted
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment has essen-
tially the same effect in the context of federal legislation. 67 In
any event, the Court has never suggested that, merely because
the fifth amendment refers to "property" and the contracts
clause by its terms applies only to the states, there is no basis
for constitutional challenges to federal legislation impairing
contractual rights. 68 Quite the contrary, such landmark cases
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (explicit or implied contractual right to
government employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (statutory entitle-
ments to welfare benefits).
66 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
67 L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 9-5, at 465 n.l; Hale, The Supreme Court and the
Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 890-<)1 (1944).
68 There are, to be sure, statements in some bankruptcy cases to the effect that
federal bankruptcy legislation impairing unsecured creditors' rights is constitutionally
unproblematic simply because the contracts clause applies only to the states. E.g.,
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); In re American Kitchen Foods,
Inc., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 715, 719 (Bankr. N.D. Me. June 8, 1976). For the
reasons explained in the text, however, such statements are quite misleading. The
Supreme Court has at times spoken more accurately about the applicability of con-
tracts clause principles to the federal government. See Continental TIl. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. (Rock Island), 294 U.S. 648, 680-81 (1935),
quoted at infra pp. 1006-07.
The true meaning of the thought inaptly captured by the statements to the effect
that the contracts clause is not applicable to the federal government may be simply
that the bankruptcy clause represents a transfer from the states to the federal govern-
ment of the authority to exercise the historic power of sovereign states to alter or
abrogate, for legitimate reasons of public policy, the rights of creditors against their
debtors. As has been related many times, the contracts clause was adopted against
a background of extensive colonial and state legislation for the relief of debtors. The
theory of the contracts clause may be that the exercise of such power by the individual
states endangered the union and the maintenance of a sound system of credit and
commerce. The remedy adopted by the Constitution, however, was not to remove
from all government the power to alleviate the situation of debtors by impairing the
obligation of contracts, but rather to transfer that authority to the federal government
with the requirement that it be exercised uniformly: "The Congress shall have Power
... [t]o establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States " U.S. CaNST. art. l, § 8. This theory was suggested by Justice
Catron, sitting on circuit, in the leading case of In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718
(C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865). The argument might well lead one to the conclusion,
however, that the states are barred altogether from enacting insolvency or bankruptcy
acts, whether retroactive or prospective. Indeed, a variant of this argument was used
by Chief Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), in support of his conclusion, contrary to that of the majority,
that the contracts clause prohibits the states from enacting even prospective insolvency
acts. See id. at 354 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
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of constitutional law as the Legal Tender Cases69 and the Gold
Clause Cases70 involved the constitutional problems posed by
federal legislation impairing contractual rights. 71
Even if constitutional protection were limited to "property"
rights, it is by no means clear that unsecured creditors' rights
against a debtor's estate would fail to qualify as such to the
same extent as secured creditors' liens. It is true that, unlike
secured creditors, unsecured creditors have no specific interest
in any particular portion of the debtor's assets. Unsecured
creditors do, however, pave legally recognized interests in the
debtor's assets as a whole. Through various forms of process
specified by state debtor-creditor law, virtually all of a debtor's
assets may be reached to satisfy the demands of his creditors.
Furthermore, state debtor-creditor law is replete with provi-
sions designed to protect unsecured creditors' rights in the
debtor's assets. Fraudulent conveyance law is, of course, the
prime example, though analogous concepts can be found in
related bodies of law such as bulk sales laws, restrictions on
dividend payments by corporations, and the like. 72 In a loose
sense, therefore, the debtor's property is "a trust fund charged
primarily with the payment of [the debtor's] liabilities."73
Reliance on the labels "property" and "contract," therefore,
hardly suffices to explain the supposed distinction between the
constitutional rights of secured and unsecured creditors. The
task thus is to identify more precisely the differences between
secured and unsecured creditors' rights and to consider
whether these differences warrant the conclusion that different
constitutional principles apply in the two fields.
An unsecured creditor's legal right against the debtor can
be divided into two components: obligation and remedy. The
obligation is the debtor's personal liability to repay the debt.
It is an obligation that the legal system generally stands
ready to enforce, except to the extent that the bankruptcy
system permits the debtor to obtain a discharge. The remedy
is execution or similar process specified by state law, pursuant
to which the unsecured creditor can cause property of the
debtor to be seized and sold in order to satisfy the claim.
The secured creditor's legal right against the debtor can be
divided into the same two components. There is no difference
69 Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
70 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
294 U.S. 240 (1935)·
71 See Norman, 294 U.S. at 304-05, 307-08; Knox, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 475.
72 See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 505 (1977).
73 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504 (1913).
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between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors with
respect to the obligation. As in the case of unsecured creditors'
rights, the legal system's readiness to enforce the debtor's per-
sonal liability to the secured creditor is qualified by the dis-
charge provisions of bankruptcy law. The difference between
secured creditors' rights and unsecured creditors' rights lies in
the remedy: the secured creditor has identified in advance of
default the property to be seized and sold in satisfaction of his
claim. 74 The law stands ready to enforce the secured creditor's
right to have this property seized and sold, and if the secured
creditor has taken the necessary perfecting steps,75 the legal
system will recognize his claim to this property to have priority
over most other interests in the property. 76
That the secured creditor has preselected the particular
property to be devoted to the satisfaction of his claim seems
to play a strong role in the contention that secured creditors'
"property" rights are a matter of special constitutional signifi-
cance. 77 Curiously, however, the identity of the specific prop-
erty involved is perhaps the matter of least importance to the
secured creditor. The secured creditor has no concern about
the collateral per se. Rather, the secured creditor's concerns
are only that the collateral have and retain sufficient value to
satisfy his claim and that it be readily salable - the same
concerns that unsecured creditors have about the debtor's
property in general. Indeed, the preselection of the property
to be devoted to repayment of his claim is one aspect of the
secured creditor's remedial rights that even adherents of the
Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis seem to concede may be
impaired in bankruptcy. Under sections 361-364 of the Bank-
74 The notion that the secured creditor's remedial right is a "property" right may
derive much of its intuitive force from the perception of the mortgage on Blackacre
as the paradigm of secured financing. Secured financing law, however, has become
far more complex. One of the most significant forms of modem secured financing -
and the form that often presents the most difficult problems in reorganization - is
financing on the security of the inventory or accounts receivable of an enterprise.
The collateral in such arrangements is more of an accounting concept than a specific
piece of property. Once we move from a mortgage on Blackacre to a floating lien,
see u.c.c. §§ 9-204 to -205 (1977), on accounts, the "property rights" perspective
becomes blurred. The remedial right of the secured creditor in an accounts receivable
financing arrangement is the right, upon the debtor's default, to have the debtor's
contractual claims against others paid to the creditor rather than to the debtor or
other creditors of the debtor. I d. § 9-502. The arbitrariness of classifying such a
sophisticated bundle of rights as either "property" or "contract" belies the suggestion
that decisions of constitutional significance should be based on the classification.
7S E.g., id. §§ 9-302 to -306.
76 E.g., id. §§ 9-201, -301, -312.
77 See, e.g., Murphy I, supra note 7, at 23.
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ruptcy Code, which appear to have been drafted to comply
with the supposed requirements of the Unconstitutional Im-
pairment Thesis,78 a bankruptcy court may freely take away
a secured creditor's rights against his specific collateral and
substitute a lien on other property of the debtor having equal
value. 79 An argument for the Unconstitutional Impairment
Thesis that is premised on the fact that the secured creditor
has preselected the property to be devoted to his claim is
therefore curious indeed. Notwithstanding the premise that
preselection of specific assets is constitutionally significant, the
argument admits that the claim to specific assets can freely be
disregarded, and shifts without explanation to the supposed
conclusion that only the value of that property must be pre-
served.
The specificity of the secured creditor's claim against the
debtor's property is therefore a matter of neither practical nor
constitutional significance. Rather, the factor that distin-
guishes secured creditors' rights from those of unsecured cred-
itors is that, as a matter of state law, the secured creditor's
claim ranks above those of the unsecured creditors. It is dif-
ficult, however, to see why the particular position of the se-
cured creditor in the ranking of claims against the debtor's
property is entitled to constitutional protection not enjoyed by
claimants occupying different ranks. To be sure, as a matter
of state law concerning creditors' rights, secured creditors rank
above unsecured creditors, and unsecured creditors rank above
ownership interests. Yet if the essence of the secured creditor's
right is simply his priority ranking, why should it be thought,
as the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis contends, that any
significant disruption of ranking that affects secured creditors
is a matter of major constitutional signficance while a disrup-
tion of priority ranking that affects other claimants - for
example, that effected by granting a discharge80 - is entirely
unproblematic?
I am inclined to suspect that the notion that secured cred-
itors are entitled to far greater constitutional protection than
are unsecured creditors rests on nothing more than a confusion
78 See supra p. 978.
79 See Coogan, The New Bankruptcy Code: The Death of Security Interest?, 14
GA. L. REv. 153, 162-66 (1980); cf Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312
U.S. 510, 530 (1941) ("If the creditors are adequately compensated for the loss of their
prior claims, it is not material [for the purposes of the absolute priority rule] out of
what assets they are paid.").
80 Both the discharge and the exemption provisions enable individual debtors,
whose claims to their assets are analogous to those of the shareholders of a corporation,
to retain assets despite creditors' prior claims to the property.
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between the nature of secured creditors' claims and the partic-
ular form that our legal system has evolved for the implemen-
tation of those claims. Perhaps solely as a matter of historical
accident, the system of risk allocation embodied in secured
financing arrangements has been implemented through the
mechanism of granting to the creditor a property interest in
certain assets of the debtor. There is, however, no logical
necessity about this choice of mechanism. One can imagine a
system of "secured" financing that would be functionally iden-
tical to the current system but that would rest simply on a
scheme of contractual priorities. Contractual agreements
might provide that some percentage of the debtor's assets be
devoted exclusively to the claims of a particular "secured"
creditor, so that the secured creditor would have to share with
the general creditors only the balance of the estate. To protect
this contractual allocation of risk from disruption by a decrease
in the value of the debtor's entire estate, the contracts might
provide that the "secured" creditor could immediately begin
collection proceedings if the value of the debtor's assets
dropped below some specified value. Had such a system
evolved, I doubt that anyone would be inclined to regard the
fifth amendment to have particularly greater relevance to the
question whether this system of contractual priorities could be
modified in reorganization proceedings than to the question
whether other contractual rights may be impaired in reorga-
nization.
If all that distinguishes the secured from the unsecured
creditor is that the secured creditor has sought to protect him-
self from risks of nonpayment through contractual arrange-
ments concerning the debtor's property, Chief Justice Hughes'
comment in the Gold Clause Cases provides a complete answer
to the secured creditor's contention that his "property" rights
entitle him to special constitutional protection: "Contracts may
create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a sub-
ject matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they
have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their trans-
actions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by
making contracts about them. "81 Suppose, for example, that
a debtor and one of his unsecured creditors signed a contract
providing that in the event of insolvency the claim of that
particular creditor would be paid before those of all other
creditors. If the debtor went bankrupt and the creditor came
into bankruptcy court to enforce this contract, he would be
met with hearty laughter; if he claimed that failure to enforce
81 Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 307-08 (1935).
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his agreement would violate the Constitution, the laughter
would only increase. One simply cannot contract out of the
bankruptcy power.
3. The Requirement of Preservation of the Value of Collat-
eral. - Even if the supposed distinction between secured
creditors' "property" rights and unsecured creditors' "contrac-
tual" claims provided a persuasive reason for distinguishing
between the constitutional rights of secured creditors and those
of unsecured creditors, that distinction would fail to explain
the assumption of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis that
preservation of the value of the collateral is the key constitu-
tional right of the secured creditor. One who contends that
secured creditors' "property" rights are entitled to special con-
stitutional protection might argue that the secured creditor
should be protected against any impairment of the rights that
he would otherwise enjoy by virtue of his state-created prop-
erty rights in the collateral. It is, however, quite clear that
our present reorganization system does not provide such ex-
tensive protection. Yet once one concedes that such full pro-
tection is not compelled, one is left without any principled
basis for asserting that a specific lesser degree of protection -
preservation of the value of the collateral - is required.
Although commentators have occasionally asserted that
Congress cannot, without granting compensation, authorize
any action in reorganization proceedings that might place the
secured creditor in an economic position less advantageous
than the position he would occupy if his collateral were liq-
uidated at the date of the inception of bankruptcy proceed-
ings,82 our bankruptcy system falls far short of this level of
protection. Consider the problems presented when the value
of the secured creditor's collateral is at least equal to the
principal amount of the debt but prevailing rates of interest
have risen since the time the loan was made. If the secured
creditor were not restrained from exercising his contractual
rights, he could have the property sold at a judicial sale, obtain
full repayment of his loan, and reinvest the proceeds at pre-
vailing interest rates. If the constitutional requirement in re-
organization proceedings were that the secured creditor's eco-
nomic position not be impaired, restraint of foreclosure would
be permissible only if interest accrued during the reorganiza-
tion at prevailing market rates, not the contract rate; further-
more, the restraint could be continued only as long as the
value of the property exceeded the amount of the debt plus
interest at prevailing market rates. Our present reorganization
82 Chicago Comment, supra note 7, at 5I 7.
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system hardly guarantees the secured creditor such treat-
ment. 83
Indeed, even aside from the matter of fluctuation in pre-
vailing interest rates, our reorganization practice is not consis-
tent with the thesis that a secured creditor's economic position
may not be impaired. Suppose, for example, that at the in-
ception of reorganization proceedings the value of the se-
cured creditor's collateral were exactly equal to the principal
amount of his claim. Even if the value of the collateral did
not depreciate, a requirement of full protection of the secured
creditor's economic position would preclude any restraint of
foreclosure, for as time passes the secured creditor's economic
position will be eroded by the increasing inability of the col-
lateral to cover the amount of the debt plus accrued interest. 84
Yet the adequate protection provisions of the new Bankruptcy
Code require only that the secured creditor be protected
against any decrease in the value of his interest in the collat-
eral,85 and hence do not preclude impairment of the secured
party's total economic position resulting from the inability of
the collateral to cover accrued interest. 86
Thus, the supposed constitutional'requirement of protection
of the value of the secured creditor's collateral, as mirrored in
the statutory adequate protection provisions, falls far short of
protecting the economic position that the secured creditor
sought by obtaining collateral and would have enjoyed had
bankruptcy proceedings not been initiated.87 There is, how-
83 There are significant limits on the accrual of postpetition interest even at the
contract rate, see infra note 84, and I have never even seen it argued that a creditor
could claim interest at a higher market rate. Cf. 4 COLLIER, supra note 7, '1542.03,
at 542-7 to -8 & n. I (secured creditor who is required to turn over property to the
trustee under Bankruptcy Code § 542, II U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. V1981), is not entitled
to adequate protection for forgone profits from his own alternative use of the property).
84 Although the old Bankruptcy Act was silent on the issue of the accrual of
interest, it seems to have been generally accepted that a secured creditor is entitled
to claim postpetition interest in addition to principal only up to a maximum fixed by
the value of his collateral. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 454 F.2d 9, 16 (3d
Cir. 1972); 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'! 9.08 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978). These
principles have been codified in § 506(b) of the new Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C.
§ 506(b) (Supp. V 1981).
85 See Bankruptcy Code § 361, II U.S.C. § 361 (Supp. V 1981).
86 For an extensive consideration of the issue of adequate protection of postpetition
interest, reaching the same conclusion expressed in the text, see O'Toole, Adequate
Protection and Postpetition Interest in Chapter II Proceedings, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J.
251 (1982).
87 In another sense, however, the notion that the value of the collateral is the
measure of secured creditors' constitutionally protected rights might be thought overly
generous. In the first place, a secured creditor who sustains a loss as a result of a
stay of foreclosure in an unsuccessful reorganization will receive a federal income tax
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ever, no apparent explanation for the assumption that the less
rigorous requirement of preservation of the value of collateral
marks a bright line beyond which impairment of the secured
creditor's economic position becomes impermissible. Indeed,
the relationship between the secured creditor's total economic
interest and the value of the collateral is wholly fortuitous: it
depends entirely on such factors as the contract interest rate,
the prevailing market interest rate, and the duration of the
reorganization proceedings.
Thus, even if one could find a commodious textual or
jurisprudential mooring for the notion that fifth amendment
principles limit even prospective bankruptcy legislation, one
would encounter serious problems in attempting to support the
Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis; it is very difficult to find
any principled basis for either the Thesis' sharp distinction
between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors or the
Thesis' emphasis on the preservation of the value of collateral
as the matter of critical constitutional significance. Moreover,
these problems equally cast doubt on even a limited version
of the Thesis - that secured creditors' rights to have the value
of their collateral preserved may not constitutionally be im-
paired by retroactive bankruptcy legislation. This matter is
discussed in more detail in Part ill of this Article.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE
The preceding Part demonstrates that the Unconstitutional
Impairment Thesis is wholly unsatisfactory. I submit that the
fundamental flaw in the Thesis is the assumption that the
takings clause or other fifth amendment principles provide an
independent source of limitations on the substantive scope of
the bankruptcy power. In the balance of this Article, I develop
an alternative view of the relationship between the bankruptcy
clause and the family of constitutional provisions - including
the takings clause, the due process clause, and the contracts
clause - that limit the extent to which contractual or property
deduction for the amount of his loss. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 538-39. The
federal government thus already provides a form of partial compensation for the losses
that may be inflicted by the reorganization system. Furthermore, one might contend
that no creditor can be constitutionally entitled to more than repayment of his loan
in full plus a fair interest rate for the period during which the loan was outstanding.
If a secured creditor has been charging a premium above the risk-free lending rate to
protect himself against the possibility of nonpayment, one migh~ argue that the added
interest that he has received during the term of the loan must be deducted from the
amount to which he is entitled.
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rights may be impaired by governmental action. My thesis is
that these constitutional provisions do not impose substantive
limitations on congressional exercise of the bankruptcy power.
Instead, the principal source of substantive limitations on
bankruptcy legislation is the bankruptcy clause itself, and
hence the constitutionality of a statute adopted under the bank-
ruptcy clause depends only on whether the measure falls within
the scope of the powers conferred by the bankruptcy clause.
In this Part, I examine the principal nineteenth and early
twentieth century decisions that resolved the fundamental is-
sues concerning the constitutionality of bankruptcy legislation,
and demonstrate that these decisions support the model of the
relationship between the bankruptcy clause and the fifth
amendment described above rather than the model implicit in
the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis. Moreover, in the
course of examining the development of bankruptcy legislation,
I attempt to define the scope of the bankruptcy power as it
has evolved during the past two centuries. Finally, I consider
the constitutionality of restraint of secured creditors' rights in
reorganization from the perspective of this model.
A. The Historical Development of the Scope of the
Bankruptcy Power
The first step in a satisfactory analysis of the constitutional
limits of the bankruptcy power is to consider why the fifth
amendment, or analogous constitutional principles, has not
been regarded as a significant restraint on the extent to which
bankruptcy law may impair unsecured creditors' rights. Care-
ful examination of the nineteenth century cases that resolved
basic issues concerning the constitutionality of bankruptcy leg-
islation reveals that the courts did not rely on any simplistic
notion of the supposed distinction between contractual and
property rights. Rather, the substantial impairments of unse-
cured creditors' rights that are effected by any bankruptcy
legislation were upheld against constitutional challenge on the
ground that, because such impairments are inevitable in the
bankruptcy system, they necessarily must be authorized by the
bankruptcy clause.
r. Scope of the Bankruptcy Power: Voluntary Straight
Bankruptcy. - The first significant case in the evolution of
the analysis of the relationship between the bankruptcy clause
and the fifth amendment is In re Klein,88 which involved the
88 14 F. Cas. 716 (C.C.D. Mo.) (No. 7865), rev'g 14 F. Cas. 719 (D. Mo. 1843)
(No. 7866).
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1841 Bankruptcy Act. 89 The 1841 Act, in a sharp departure
from prior English bankruptcy law90 and the 1800 federal
bankruptcy act,91 was at least as much a measure for the relief
of debtors as it was a creditors' remedy:92 it provided for
voluntary bankruptcies; it applied to any type of debtor rather
than being limited to those engaged in trade; and it provided
for the discharge of debts without the consent of creditors. 93
In the district court, Judge Wells held the 1841 Act unconsti-
tutional,94 essentially on the theory that the power conferred
on Congress by the bankruptcy clause was only the power to
enact bankruptcy legislation substantially as it had been
known in English law at the time the Constitution was
adopted. 95
The district court's ruling in In re Klein was reversed on
appeal in an opinion written by Justice Catron of the Supreme
Court, sitting on circuit. 96 Justice Catron rejected the district
court's approach of tying the bankruptcy power to prior En-
glish practice, and adopted an expansive view of the power
conferred by the bankruptcy clause:
I hold [that the bankruptcy power] extends to all cases
where the law causes to be distributed the property of the
debtor among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest
is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And all in-
termediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tend-
ing to further the great end of the subject - distribution and
discharge - are in the competency and discretion of congress.
With the policy of a law, letting in all classes, others as well
as traders, and permitting the bankrupt to come in voluntar-
ily, and be discharged without the consent of his creditors,
the courts have no concern; it belongs to the law makers. 97
The difference between the approaches of Judge Wells and
Justice Catron is quite significant. Judge Wells' opinion rests
on alternative grounds: first, that English practice defined the
89 Act of Aug. 19. 1841. ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch.
82g, 5 Stat. 614.
90 See I H. REMINGTON, ATREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 2-6 (5th ed. 1950).
91 Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19. 2 Stat. 19. repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 18°3, ch.
6, 2 Stat. 248; see I H. REMINGTON, supra note 90, § 7.
92 See C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 49--92 (1935).
93 See I H. REMINGTON, supra note 90, § 8.
94 14 F. Cas. 719 (D. Mo.) (No. 7866). rev'd, 14 F. Cas. 716 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843)
(No. 7865).
95 See id. at 720-21.
96 14 F. Cas. 716 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865).
97 [d. at 718.
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scope of the bankruptcy power and confined it to creditors'
relief measures,98 and second, that the 1841 Act violated the
contracts clause. 99 It is the latter argument that is of interest
here. Judge Wells regarded the principles embodied in the
contracts clause as fundamental limits on the power of gov-
ernment that must apply to the federal government as well as
to the states,lOO and he seems to have considered it obvious
that a statute that permits a debtor to initiate a voluntary
bankruptcy proceeding and obtain a discharge of his debts is
a law impairing the obligation of contracts. lOl Thus, Judge
Wells' opinion may be interpreted to suggest that creditors'
rights to have the debtor's property devoted to satisfaction of
their claims are entitled to constitutional protection and that
the necessity of protecting such rights operates as an indepen-
dent limitation on the permissible exercise of the bankruptcy
power.
Justice Catron's expansive view of the bankruptcy power
cannot be fit within such a model. Justice Catron did not
dispute Judge Wells' suggestion that creditors' rights might in
some contexts be entitled to constitutional protection. Rather,
Justice Catron's response to Judge Wells' contracts clause ar-
gument was simply that the bankruptcy clause confers on
Congress the authority to enact legislation that has the effect
of impairing the obligation of contracts. 102 Under Justice Cat-
ron's approach, the contracts clause component of the fifth
amendment has no independent significance in the context of
bankruptcy legislation. Instead, Justice Catron's view seems
to have been that, if the act in question falls within the scope
of the bankruptcy power, no question of unconstitutional im-
pairment of the obligation of contracts is presented. Though
the Klein decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court, its
authority is beyond ,question; indeed, Justice Catron's opinion
98 See 14 F. Cas. at 720-21.
99 See id. at 722-27.
100 I d. at 724-25 (contracts clause contains "a great principle of justice, which no
legislative body should violate"). Judge Wells presented two arguments to explain the
absence of a constitutional provision explicitly barring federal laws impairing the
obligation of contracts. First, he suggested that such a provision would have been
unnecessary, because the federal government possesses only those powers explicitly
conferred by the Constitution, none of which includes the power to impair the obli-
gation of contracts. Id. at 725. Second, he suggested that the takings clause of the
fifth amendment may be read to encompass contracts clause principles. [d. at 729.
101 [d. at 722-23.
102 14 F. Cas. at 717-18.
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has been cited frequently by the Court as the leading statement
of the scope of the bankruptcy power. 103
The approval in Klein of legislation providing for voluntary
straight bankruptcy marks the beginning of the evolution of
the modern concept of bankruptcy. At any given time, a
debtor owns a certain pool of economic values that might be
devoted to the repayment of his debts. Viewed broadly, the
debtor's pool of economic values would include not only his
existing assets, but also his earning power, from which the
debtor may derive additional property in the future. Although
the complexities of the early common law system for the col-
lection of money judgments enabled creditors to reach only
certain types of the debtor's assets, by at least the middle of
the nineteenth century essentially all of the debtor's pool of
economic values could be reached to satisfy the demands of
creditors, except to the extent of limitation by exemption laws
and doctrines of dormancy. 104
A bankruptcy act that permits a debtor to initiate voluntary
bankruptcy and obtain a discharge significantly limits the ex-
tent to which the debtor's pool of economic values may be
devoted to the satisfaction of claims of creditors. The dis-
charge provisions105 effectively exempt the debtor's earning
power from the reach of his creditors, and the exemption
provisions lO6 remove a certain portion of the debtor's existing
property from the reach of creditors. The justification for these
limitations is, of course, the familiar "fresh start" policy of
bankruptcy law. 107 The early cases such as In re Klein deter-
mined that exemption and discharge provisions were generally
constitutional. Therefore, the substantive power conferred by
the bankruptcy clause includes at least the authority to deter-
mine the extent to which a debtor's pool of economic values
shall be devoted to the satisfaction of the claims of his existing
creditors.
2. Scope oj the Bankruptcy Power: Binding Compositions.
- The next significant step in the evolution of the bankruptcy
power came in 1874 when Congress, for the first time, adopted
103 E.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 n.18
(1935); Continental TIl. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. Ry. (Rock
Island), 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186
(1902).
104 See Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law - A Histor-
ical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IOWA L. REv. 155 (1957).
105 Bankruptcy Code §§ 523-524, 727, II U.S.C. §§ 523-524, 727 (Supp. V 1981).
106Id. § 522, II U.S.C. § 522.
107 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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a bankruptcy provision permitting a composition arrangement
accepted by a majority of creditors to bind dissenting credi-
tors. 108 In the case of In re Reiman,109 the constitutionality
of the 1874 Act was challenged by creditors who had dissented
from a composition approved by the necessary majority of the
creditors of two partners engaged in a business enterprise. The
report of the case does not indicate whether the dissenting
creditors explicitly relied upon the fifth amendment. It does,
however, state that the dissenting creditors contended that the
release of a debtor from his debts must be accompanied by a
surrender of all of his property to his creditors and that a "law
which provides for such release, without such surrender, is, so
far as non-assenting creditors are concerned, merely a law for
the confiscation of their debts, for the benefit of the bankrupt
or debtor, and not a law on the subject of bankruptcies, within
the meaning of the constitution." 110
The Act was upheld in In re Reiman, and both the district
and circuit courts, following Justice Catron's approach in In
re Klein, devoted their opinions entirely to the question
whether the Act fell within the scope of the powers conferred
by the bankruptcy clause. The opinions contain no suggestion
that the fifth amendment operates as an independent limitation
on the scope of the bankruptcy power. III
In re Reiman's approval of the principle of binding com-
positions marks a significant step in the evolution of the con-
cept of bankruptcy, for the composition principle lies at the
heart of the reorganization provisions of modern bankruptcy
law. In one sense, composition proceedings differ only slightly
from straight bankruptcy proceedings. Both types of proceed-
ings can be described as procedures implementing governmen-
tal decisions concerning the extent to which a debtor's pool of
economic values shall be devoted to the satisfaction of his
creditors' claims: in straight bankruptcy the debtor's future
earning power is freed from the demands of creditors, leaving
them to seek repayment out of the debtor's existing nonexempt
108 Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178, 182. For the history of the
1874 provision, see C. WARREN, supra note 92, at n8-20. A composition provision
had been included in an 1827 bankruptcy bill that was not enacted. Id. at 44-45.
109 20 F. Cas. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. n,673), aff'd, 20 F. Cas. 500
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. n,67S).
110 Id. at 493.
III In re Reiman was not appealed to the Supreme Court, but later Supreme
Court cases adopted and approved the analysis of the Reiman decision. See, e.g.,
Continental TIl. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. (Rock Island),
294 U.S. 648, 672-73 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186
(1902).
1983] FIFTH AMENDMENT AND BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE 1003
assets; in composition proceedings the debtor's existing assets
are freed from the demands of creditors, leaving them to seek
repayment only from the debtor's future earnings. One might
suggest, therefore, that the approval of the composition prin-
ciple in Reiman represents only a limited development from
the Klein concept of bankruptcy as simply a matter of limiting
the extent to which the debtor's pool of economic values shall
be devoted to the satisfaction of his creditors' claims. Subse-
quent cases, however, make clear that far more is involved in
the acceptance of the composition principle.
3. Scope of the Bankruptcy Power: Reorganization. - The
significance of the composition concept is suggested by the
Supreme Court's decision in the 1883 case of Canada Southern
Railway v. Gebhard. 112 Holders of mortgage bonds of a
Canadian railway corporation brought suit on their bonds in
a United States circuit court. 113 The railroad defended on the
basis of an act of the Canadian Parliament that bound non-
assenting creditors, such as the plaintiffs, to the terms of an
arrangement approved by a majority of the creditors of the
railroad. 114 The Supreme Court's opinion accepting the rail-
road's defense may have been based solely on the view that
the arrangement was valid under Canadian law,115 but the
opinion also suggests that the arrangement would have been
entirely proper even if tested under the standards of the United
States Constitution:
The confirmation and legalization of "a scheme of arrange-
ment" under such circumstances is no more than is done in
bankruptcy when a "composition" agreement with the bank-
rupt debtor, if assented to by the required majority of credi-
tors, is made binding on the non-assenting minority. In no
just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a person
of his property without due process of law. They simply
require each individual to so conduct himself for the general
good as not unnecessarily to injure another. Bankrupt laws
have been in force in England for more than three centuries,
and they had their origin in the Roman law. The Constitution
expressly empowers the Congress of the United States to es-
tablish such laws. Every member of a political community
must necessarily part with some of the rights which, as an
individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might
have retained. Such concessions make up the consideration
he gives for the obligation of the body politic to protect him
112 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
113 See id. at 528, 531.
114 See id. at 529-32.
115 See id. at 536-40.
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in life, liberty, and property. Bankrupt laws, whatever may
be the form they assume, are of that character. 116
Any question about the force of what may have been dicta
in Canada Southern was laid to rest in Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Ry.117 Rock Island was the Supreme Court's first de-
cision On the constitutionality of a modern reorganization act,
the railroad reorganization provisions of section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act. 118 Justice Sutherland's opinion traced the
development of bankruptcy legislation and noted that each
extension of the concept of bankruptcy had been held consti-
tutional. 119 As to the reorganization concept embodied in sec-
tion 77, the Court held that the approval of the composition
principle in In re Reiman and Canada Southern sufficed to
demonstrate that section 77 fell within the scope of the bank-
ruptcy power. 120 The Court quoted and explicitly approved
the Canada Southern discussion of the relationship between
the bankruptcy power and the due process clause. 121
The Canada Southern and Rock Island cases are significant
at two levels. First, Klein and Reiman involved challenges to
bankruptcy legislation brought by unsecured creditors; hence
adherents of the Unconstitutional Impairment Thesis might,
on that ground, consider the two cases to be beside the point.
Canada Southern and Rock Island, however, involved chal-
lenges brought by secured creditors. Nonetheless, the consti-
tutional analysis applied was that developed in Klein and the
other nineteenth century cases dealing with unsecured credi-
tors' rights. Indeed, in Canada Southern the Court explicitly
referred to the due process clause and made it quite clear that
a valid exercise of the bankruptcy power is not open to attack
on fifth amendment grounds. 122
Second, the approval of bankruptcy legislation providing
for reorganization of corporate enterprises represents a signif-
116 [d. at 536; accord id. at 539.
117 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
118 Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 8, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (current version at
Bankruptcy Code §§ II61-II74, II U.S.C. §§ II61-II74 (Supp. V 1981».
119 See 294 U.S. at 667-7I.
120 [d. at 671-75.
121 [d. at 673-75.
122 109 U.S. at 536. The impairment of the rights of the secured creditors in
Canada Southern was by no means insubstantial. Indeed, the arrangement imposed
by act of the Canadian Parliament did not even comply with the absolute priority
rule: the claims of holders of mortgage bonds for accrued interest were extinguished
even though holders of junior mortgage bonds and stockholders retained interests in
the reorganized company. [d. at 530.
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icant advance in the evolution of the bankruptcy power. In
the case of individual debtors, such as the partners in In re
Reiman, the composition concept might be viewed as simply
an alternative method of distributing to creditors the portion
of the debtor's pool of economic values that is not essential to
his fresh start. Yet because the fresh start policy of straight
bankruptcy is in large measure a humanitarian concept appli-
cable only to individual debtors, the application of the com-
position concept to corporate debtors must rest squarely on the
proposition that preserving the earning power of an existing
enterprise for the benefit of all those affected by its affairs is
a legitimate objective of bankruptcy legislation. Moreover, in
the case of business enterprises, there is a close relationship
between the use of existing assets and future earning power.
A natural person's future earning power may be largely a
function of his intelligence, skill, industry, and other personal
characteristics, but the future earning power of a business
enterprise is in large part a function of the uses to which its
assets are devoted. Accordingly, preserving the earning power
of a business enterprise invariably requires assertion of control
over the use of the enterprise's existing assets - for example,
as in In re Reiman, by abrogating creditors' rights to have
those assets immediately devoted to the satisfaction of the
creditors' claims. Thus, In re Reiman, Canada Southern, and
Rock Island suggest an expansion of the scope of the substan-
tive powers conferred by the bankruptcy clause: the bank-
ruptcy clause confers on the federal government the authority
to exercise control over the use of the debtor's existing assets
in order to enhance and preserve his earning power. 123
B. The Permissibility of Restraint of Secured Creditors'
Foreclosure Rights
Thus far, I have considered at a general level the analysis
of the relationship between the bankruptcy clause and the fifth
amendment that was developed and applied in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century bankruptcy cases. In this Section,
123 Indeed, the proposition that the bankruptcy power comprehends the power to
take action intended to preserve the debtor's earning power may be implicit even in
simple bankruptcy legislation of the sort involved in In re Klein. The fresh start
policy may, in part, be seen as a reflection of the fear that permitting creditors to
exercise fully their state law collection rights might destroy the debtor's earning power.
Saddled with debts, deprived of assets necessary for minimal comfort, and knowing
that the fruits of his endeavors will be taken by creditors, the debtor may simply
forgo productive activity, and economic society will lose a potentially productive
member.
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I use the proposition that the limits on the substantive scope
of the bankruptcy power derive from the bankruptcy clause
itself to examine the extent to which secured creditors may be
restrained from foreclosing on their collateral during the pen-
dency of reorganization proceedings.
The issue of the permissibility of interim stays of secured
creditors' foreclosure rights was considered by the Supreme
Court in the Rock Island case, in which the reorganization
court had entered an order restraining a group of secured
creditors of the railroad from selling or disposing of their
collateral pending the effort to devise a plan of reorganiza-
tion. 124 It is quite noteworthy that, before addressing the
secured creditors' contention that the restraint order violated
the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court felt it necessary to
consider the constitutionality of the railroad reorganization act
in general as an exercise of the bankruptcy power, even though
that issue had not been raised by the parties. 125 This approach
is precisely what one would expect of a court applying the
model of constitutional analysis developed in In re Klein and
the other nineteenth century cases. Having found that the
pursuit of reorganization was a legitimate objective of bank-
ruptcy legislation, the Court readily concluded that the reor-
ganization court had authority to enjoin secured creditors from
selling the collateral "if a sale would so hinder, obstruct and
delay the preparation and consummation of a plan of reorga-
nization as probably to prevent it." 126 Moreover, as one would
expect in light of the constitutional model developed in the
nineteenth century cases, when the Court passed from consid-
eration of the constitutionality of section 77 under the bank-
ruptcy clause to the fifth amendment challenge, it found the
latter issue entirely unproblematic. Justice Sutherland's re-
marks are worth setting forth at length:
We find no substance in the contention of the petitioning
banks that § 77, as applied by the court below to permit an
injunction restraining the sale of the collateral, violates the
Fifth Amendment. The basis of the contention is that since,
by the terms of the pledge, the pledgors are empowered on
default to sell the collateral at such times as they may select,
§ 77, as thus applied, deprives them of their property - that
is to say, impairs or destroys their contractual rights - with-
out due process of law.
The Constitution, as it many times has been pointed out,
does not in terms prohibit Congress from impairing the obli-
124 See 294 U.S. at 656-61.
125 See id. at 667; supra p. 1004.
126 294 U.S. at 675.
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gation of contracts as it does the states. But as far back as
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388, it was said that among other
acts which Congress could not pass without exceeding its
authority was "a law that destroys or impairs the lawful
private contracts of citizens." The broad reach of that state-
ment has been restricted; but the principle which it includes
has never been repudiated, although the extent to which it
may be carried has not been definitely fixed. Speaking gen-
erally, it may be said that Congress, while without power to
impair the obligation of contracts by laws acting directly and
independently to that end, undeniably, has authority to pass
legislation pertinent to any of the powers conferred by the
Constitution, however it may operate collaterally or inciden-
tally to impair or destroy the obligation of private contracts.
And under the express power to pass uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies, the legislation is valid though drawn
with the direct aim and effect of relieving insolvent persons
in whole or in part from the payment of their debts. So much
necessarily results from the nature of the power, and this must
have been within the contemplation of the framers of the
Constitution when the power was granted. 127
This passage is about as clear a statement of the relationship
between the fifth amendment and the bankruptcy clause as
can be found in the case law.
The significance of Rock Island is highlighted by the strik-
ing contrast between that decision and Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell,128 decided one year before Rock Is-
land. In Blaisdell, a contracts clause and due process129 chal-
lenge to the Minnestota Mortgage Moratorium Act, which
authorized a stay of foreclosure for no more than two years, 130
was rejected by only a five-to-four decision and over the
strongly worded dissent of Justice Sutherland. l3l By the time
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Rock Island, the
secured creditors in that case had already been restrained for
a period of sixteen months,132 yet it was Justice Sutherland,
writing for a unanimous Court, who readily upheld the order
enjoining the secured creditors from foreclosing. The differ-
127 Id. at 680-81 (citations omitted).
128 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
129 Although Blaisdell is generally regarded as a contracts clause case, the mort-
gagee also contended that the challenged statute took his property without due process
of law, id. at 404. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion for the majority appears to consider
the two contentions essentially equivalent. See id. at 448.
130 See id. at 415-16 (discussing Act of Apr. 18, 1933, 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 339).
131 See id. at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
132 See Rock Island, 294 U.S. at 648, 657.
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ence between the two cases is only that the federal government
possesses a power denied to the states - the bankruptcy
power. Thus, the only explanation for the striking difference
between the Court's responses in the two cases is the propo-
sition that the bankruptcy clause trumps the fifth amendment.
The Rock Island case thus suggests that questions concern-
ing the constitutionality of interim restraints of secured credi-
tors' foreclosure rights should be analyzed in the same manner
as is any other issue involving the constitutionality of bank-
ruptcy legislation - solely as a matter of the substantive scope
of the bankruptcy power. As an illustration of such analysis,
consider the issues posed by the much-discussed Yale Express
case. 133 The district court denied both the secured creditor's
petition for leave to reclaim collateral pursuant to its security
agreement and the secured creditor's request for rental pay-
ments to compensate it for depreciation of the collatera1. 134
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the secured creditor's
petitions, on the grounds that use of the equipment was essen-
tial to continuation of the business and that there was a rea-
sonable probability of successful reorganization. 135 Although
the Yale Express opinions did not discuss constitutional issues,
some commentators have suggested that the impairment of the
secured creditor's rights in Yale Express raises serious consti-
tutional questions under the fifth amendment. 136
The only difference between Rock Island and Yale Express
is that in Yale Express it was quite certain that the secured
creditor's specific collateral would depreciate during the course
of the proceedings. Nonetheless, the secured creditor in Yale
Express faced a risk of loss only if the reorganization court's
prediction of the likelihood of successful reorganization proved
to be incorrect. 137 Thus, the assertion of a secured creditor
that he cannot be subjected to the risk of unsuccessful reor-
ganization is, in essence, an assertion that he has the right to
require that the prospect of salvaging going concern values be
133 In re Yale Express Sys., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967).
134 See id. at 991-92.
135 Id.
136 See Murphy I, supra note 7, at 34, 45-46; Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 525-
31; N.Y.U. Note, supra note 7, at 392 n.203.
137 Indeed, in Yale Express, the secured creditor faced a risk of loss only if the
effort to reorganize failed and there were no other assets available for payment of the
creditor's priority unsecured claim for the amount of depreciation of the collateral.
See infra pp. 1028-29.
In fact, the Yale Express reorganization was successful. The plan of reorganization
provided for the satisfaction of all creditors' claims, including postpetition interest,
and some participation for stockholders was confirmed. See In re Yale Express Sys.,
366 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 & n.2 (S.D.N. Y. 1973).
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sacrificed to ensure absolute protection of his interests. Yet in
light of the delineation of the scope of the bankruptcy power
in In re Reiman, Canada Southern, and Rock Island, it is
quite clear that exercising control over the debtor's existing
assets in an effort to preserve the earning power of the debtor
is a permissible exercise of the bankruptcy power and hence,
on that ground alone, is not vulnerable to fifth amendment
challenge.
The possibility that the reorganization system may err in
its prediction of the likelihood of successful reorganization does
not preclude the exercise of the power to attempt reorganiza-
tions. For example, in In re Reiman it was explicitly ruled
that the 1874 Act authorized a composition in which creditors
received notes rather than cash. 138 Nothing in the opinions
suggests that it occurred to the courts or to any of the parties
that the inevitable risk of nonpayment of the notes and further
deterioration of the debtor's financial position raised any con-
stitutional problems. 139 Similarly, nothing in the Canada
Southern opinion suggests any judicial concern with the pos-
sibility that the creditors might suffer loss by being forced to
accept securities in the reorganized enterprise rather than being
permitted to enforce their prior claims against the property of
the debtor. The only mention of the problem in Rock Island
comes in a passage in which the Court noted that the value of
the collateral might decline during the period of the stay, but
suggested that such problems raise only a question for the
reorganization court to consider in the exercise of its discretion
in ruling on requests for stays or relief therefrom. 140 Such
133 20 F. Cas. at S02; 20 F. Cas. at 497-98.
139 The debtor, of course, would not obtain his discharge if he failed to pay the
notes. In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. II,673), aff'd,
20 F. Cas. SOO (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 187S) (No. II,67S). The point, however, is that the
value of the debtor's property might decline during the period in which composition
payments were being made.
140 294 U.S. at 677. The Rock Island case is sometimes said to have posed a
fairly easy problem, on the ground that the value of the collateral held by the secured
parties far exceeded the amount of the debt secured. See Chicago Comment, supra
note 7, at SI3-1S; Yale Note I, supra note 7, at 10II-12. Had that been the case,
there would have been little risk that the creditors' position would have been impaired
by the stay. It is not so clear, however, that this was the case. The creditors objecting
to the stay were holders of collateral trust bonds aggregating $17,784,877.S8. See 294
U.S. at 6S7-60. The collateral for this claim consisted of other mortgage bonds of
the Rock Island and its subsidiaries in the face amount of $S6,II1,46S.8S. Id. The
face amount of the subsidiary mortgage bonds, however, can hardly be taken as the
value of the collateral securing the collateral trust bonds, see 1 A. DEWING, THE
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 210-14 (sth ed. 19S3), and there is no discus-
sion in the opinion of the value of the property securing the subsidiary mortgage
bonds.
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language is hardly what one would expect if preservation of
the value of collateral represented a rigid limitation on the
constitutionality of exercises of the bankruptcy power.
Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme
Court's 1974 decision in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases (RRRA Cases)141 provides substantial support for the
view that fifth amendment concepts concerning the protection
of secured creditors' property rights impose limitations on the
permissible extent of interim restraints of secured creditors'
rights during reorganization proceedings. 142 The Penn Central
Railroad entered reorganization proceedings in 1970. 143 In
1974, Congress enacted the Regional Rail Reorganization Act
(RRRA), 144 which provided that the rail properties of the Penn
Central and of certain other northeastern railroads also in
reorganization would be conveyed to a private state-incorpo-
rated corporation, Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail). In
return, the estates of the debtor railroads were to receive
Conrail securities and obligations of a government corporation,
the United States Railway Association, which were guaranteed
by the United States. 145 Various creditors of Penn Central
filed suit contending that the RRRA violated the takings
clause, in part on the theory that the Act's requirement of
continued rail operations pending the conveyance would erode
the value of the Penn Central estate. 146 In the RRRA Cases,
the Supreme Court sidestepped the takings clause issues by
concluding that the Act did not displace remedies that would
otherwise be available to the Penn Central estate under the
Tucker Act;147 thus, if the RRRA failed to afford the Penn
Central estate constitutionally adequate compensation, the es-
tate could sue the United States in the Court of Claims under
the Tucker Act to obtain just compensation. 148
141 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
142 See, e.g., N.Y.U. Note, supra note 7, at 391 n.203, 399-401.
143 See RRRA Cases, 419 U.S. at II7 n.12.
144 Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 986 (1974) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 701-794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
145 See RRRA Cases, 419 U.S. at 108-17.
146 See id. at II8.
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
148 See 419 U.S. at 125-36, 148. Congress subsequently amended the RRRA to
take into account "compensable unconstitutional erosion" in compensating the estate.
Railroad Reorganization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210,
§ 6I2(q), 90 Stat. 31, III-12 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 743(C) (1976». It is unlikely
that we shall see any definitive judicial resolution of the takings clause problems
presented by the RRRA, because the valuation litigation has been settled, at least
with respect to the principal parties. Wall St. ]., Nov. 18, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
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The suggestion that the RRRA Cases support the view that
the fifth amendment limits the bankruptcy power does have a
surface appeal. To be sure, the Supreme Court did not ac-
tually decide that the RRRA would violate the fifth amend-
ment in the absence of compensation. Nonetheless, if the
constitutional assertions had been insubstantial, it would have
been a simple matter for the Court to say so, rather than
undertake the heroic bit of statutory construction necessary to
reach the conclusion that the Tucker Act remedy survived. In
the RRRA Cases, however, it was irrelevant that the parties
objecting to continued deficit operations happened to be se-
cured creditors of an enterprise involved in reorganization pro-
ceedings. The issues presented would have been just the same
if the claimants to the estate had consisted solely of holders of
equity securities or even if the railroad had not been in reor-
ganization proceedings. The issue was not whether one having
the status of a secured creditor of a railroad has, by virtue of
his secured status, a fifth amendment right to be free from
erosion of the value of his particular collateral. Rather, the
issue was whether investors in a railroad may be forced to
accept an erosion of the value of the estate in its entirety
caused by continued deficit operations. 149
The real problem in the Penn Central reorganization pro-
ceedings was that within a fairly short period after the reor-
ganization proceedings were initiated it became apparent that
a traditional reorganization simply was not possible;150 the
railroad had become a financial basket case. No one could
149 Somewhat similar issues were presented in the New Haven Inclusion Cases,
399 U.S. 392 (1970), in which some of the New Haven Railroad's bondholders
contended that a plan of reorganization proposed for the New Haven violated the
requirements of the fifth amendment. They claimed that continued operation of the
New Haven during the reorganization proceedings had resulted in an erosion of the
estate by the accumulation of mOle than $70 million in administration expenses having
priority over the bondholders' claims and that no compensation had been provided
for this erosion. [d. at 489-90. As in the RRRA Cases, the constitutional problem
was not that secured creditors enjoy some special constitutional immunity from the
exercise of the bankruptcy power, but merely that the limits of the bankruptcy power
may well have been exceeded, given that it was clear in the New Haven case, as in
the RRRA Cases, that a traditional reorganization simply was not feasible. See id.
at 404-07. The Supreme Court rejected the bondholders' fifth amendment contention,
principally on procedural grounds. See id. at 493. There are indications in the
opinion, however, that the bondholders' fifth amendment claims would have been
rejected even in the absence of the above considerations, essentially on the ground
that investors in a public utility such as a railroad, which has an obligation to serve
the public, must be deemed to have accepted the risk that the value of their investment
may be eroded in order that vital public services may be continued. See id. at 4<)1-
92 •
150 See RRRA Cases, 419 U.S. at 123-24.
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plausibly contend that the purpose of continued deficit opera-
tions was to maintain a going business in order to devise an
effective plan of reorganization. Rather, the only reason for
continuing operations was the public interest in continued rail
service. In such a situation, legislation requiring continued
operations to the detriment of the estate may well exceed the
authority conferred by the bankruptcy clause.
Perhaps some source of substantive federal power aside
from the bankruptcy clause authorizes legislation requiring the
continued operation of railroads or other enterprises for the
benefit of the public rather than for the benefit of the investors
in the enterprise. Other sources of federal power that might
authorize continued deficit operations may well not share the
peculiar attribute of the bankruptcy power - its explicit au-
thorization of the imposition of losses on private interests with-
out compensation. Thus, although it is true that the RRRA
Cases pose difficult takings clause issues,151 they do so not
because the fifth amendment imposes substantive limitations
on the bankruptcy power, but because the railroad cases may
have presented situations beyond the reach of the bankruptcy
power.
The contrast between Yale Express and the RRRA Cases
illustrates the true relationship between the bankruptcy power
and the fifth amendment. In any case involving an impair-
ment of the rights of creditors or other investors in reorgani-
zation proceedings, the first issue is that of substantive power
under the bankruptcy clause. If, as in Yale Express, the action
in question is authorized under the bankruptcy clause, that
determination will generally be the end of the matter as far as
the fifth amendment goes. 152 Only if, as in the RRRA Cases,
the action in question cannot be justified under the bankruptcy
power will a takings clause issue arise.
lSI The principal issue would seem to be the question of the extent to which laws
prohibiting the termination of public utility services without the approval of regulatory
authorities place investors in such enterprises on notice that their investments may be
impaired in the interest of preserving vital public services. See Yale Note II, supra
note 7, at 387.
152 To be sure, Congress might elect to retain the adequate protection model as a
method of protecting secured creditors to be employed when feasible. The analysis
developed in this Article, however, demonstrates that nothing in the Constitution
prevents Congress from authorizing the attempt to effect a reorganization in situations
in which adequate protection cannot be provided. Congress might prefer to use the
adequate protection technique, when feasible, on the ground that proof that secured
creditors are adequately protected may be simpler than proof of the likelihood of
reorganization. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 525-32 (discussing difficulty of pre-
dicting likelihood of successful reorganization at inception of proceedings).
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ill. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE
ApPLICATION OF BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
Although the analysis developed thus far demonstrates that
the fifth amendment does not significantly constrain the sub-
stantive scope of the bankruptcy power,153 it does not neces-
sarily preclude the possibility that fifth amendment principles
may limit the extent to which Congress can give retroactive
application to amendments to bankruptcy legislation. The
problem of retroactive bankruptcy legislation was recently con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Security
Industrial Bank.l54 Relying on the canon of interpretation
that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional ques-
tions, the Court ruled that section 522(f) of the new Bank-
ruptcy Code,155 which invalidates nonpossessory, non-pur-
chase-money security interests in certain exempt property of
the debtor, should be interpreted to apply only prospec-
tively.156 Although Security Industrial Bank is less than a
square holding on the constitutional issue,157 it warrants con-
153 It is true that in Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902), the
Supreme Court stated that "Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning dis-
charge in bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with
fundamental law." Id. at 192. It is not clear from this statement, however, whether
the source of this rather trivial constraint on the exercise of the bankruptcy power is
the fifth amendment due process clause or the bankruptcy clause. Exercise of the
bankruptcy power is, of course, subject to certain fifth amendment constraints other
than the general due process and takings provisions, such as the self-incrimination
clause and the implied equal protection requirement.
154 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
155 Bankruptcy Code § 522(0(2), II U.S.C. § 522(0(2) (Supp. V 1981).
156 103 S. Ct. at 412, 414. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 414 (Blackrnun,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun stated that, if he were to reach
the constitutional issue, he would uphold the statute. Id. at 415. However, in light
of Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914), and Auffm'ordt v. Rasin, 102 U.S. 620 (1881),
Justice Blackrnun felt bound to rule, as a matter of statutory construction, that
amendments to the bankruptcy legislation should if possible be construed to preserve
rights. 103 S. Ct. at 415-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
As Justice Blackmun's opinion indicates, the result in Security Industrial Bank
need not have rested on a finding that retroactive application of § 522(0 would raise
substantial constitutional questions. Indeed, the cases on which both Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Blackmun relied for the applicable canon of interpretation of bank-
ruptcy law suggest that the presumption of prospective application is not dependent
on any special constitutional rights of secured creditors. Holt v. Henley did involve
a secured creditor's contention that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act should not
be applied in a manner that would invalidate his lien, 232 U.S. at 639; in Auffm'ordt,
however, the "vested right" in question was the right of the assignee in bankruptcy
to invalidate a pledge as a preferential transfer notwithstanding a later amendment
reducing the preference period.
157 See 103 S. Ct. at 410.
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sideration as an indication of the Court's approach to retro-
active bankruptcy legislation impairing secured creditors'
rights. In this Part, the shortcomings of the Security Indus-
trial Bank analysis are noted, and an alternative approach is
suggested. IS8
A. The Inadequacy of the Security Industrial Bank Analysis
In Security Industrial Bank, Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, rejected the argument that retroactive application
of bankruptcy legislation raises no constitutional problems as
long as the measure in question is a rational exercise of the
bankruptcy power. Justice Rehnquist conceded that the bank-
ruptcy power authorizes retroactive impairments of contractual
rights, but, relying solely on Radford, he stated that, when
exercise of the bankruptcy power impairs "traditional property
interests," the question "whether the enactment takes property
within the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment" IS9 is quite
distinct from the question whether the act is a rational exercise
of the bankruptcy power.
I. Comparison with Pre-Radford Analysis of Retroactive
Bankruptcy Legislation. - Although there is a surface appeal
to the notion that bankruptcy legislation, like legislation on
other subjects, may present more substantial constitutional
problems if it is made retroactive rather than purely prospec-
tive, much in the case law suggests, contrary to Justice Rehn-
quist's position, that retroactivity is not an objectionable fea-
ture in bankruptcy legislation. Before the time of the Radford
decision, the federal courts had almost invariably approached
questions concerning the constitutionality of bankruptcy leg-
158 IT the Constitution significantly limits the extent to which Congress can retro-
actively apply amendments to bankruptcy legislation, that fact may substantially
reduce the flexibility that the proper analysis of the relationship between the bank-
ruptcy clause and the fifth amendment appears to give Congress in the design of
bankruptcy policy. Debtors entering reorganization proceedings commonly have a
variety of creditors who extended credit at varying times. In complex reorganizations,
such as the Penn Central proceedings, the creditors may range from persons who
extended trade credit days before the proceedings were commenced to holders of
bonds issued in the nineteenth century. See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 4S8 F.
Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (order approving plan), modified in part and aff'd, 596
F.2d II02, II27, IIS4 (3d Cir. 1979). A constitutional requirement that disputes
concerning rights of creditors be resolved by reference to the law existing at the time
each creditor extended credit might present intractable administrative problems that
would inhibit adoption of even the entirely permissible prospective legislation. Some
consideration of the limits of retroactive application of amendments to bankruptcy
legislation is therefore a necessary complement to my analysis of the relationship
between the bankruptcy clause and the fifth amendment.
159 103 S. Ct. at 410.
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islation exclusively in terms of the substantive scope of the
bankruptcy power, and this analysis appears to have been
regarded as an approach applicable to retroactive as well as
prospective applications of the bankruptcy power and to cases
involving secured creditors' rights as well as those involving
unsecured creditors' rights. 16o In fact, the cases from In re
Klein through Rock Island, which were considered in Part IT
of this Article from the perspective of the source of constitu-
tional limitations on the substantive scope of bankruptcy leg-
islation,161 all appear to have involved retroactive application
of newly enacted bankruptcy legislation. 162 Moreover, the
Canada Southern and Rock Island cases both involved retro-
active impairments of secured creditors' "property" rights. 163
160 Aside from the circuit court decision in In re Dillard, 7 F. Cas. 703 (C.C.E.D.
Va. 1873) (No. 3912), discussed at infra note 173, the only pre-Radford cases that I
have found in which courts indicated that retroactivity might be a troublesome feature
of bankruptcy legislation are several decisions that interpreted provisions of the bank-
ruptcy law to be nonretroactive without discussing whether the Constitution would
prohibit retroactive application. See Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914); Auffm'ordt
v. Rasin, 102 U.S. 620 (1881), discussed at supra note IS6.
161 See supra pp. 998-IOOS.
162 The Klein case, decided in the district court in 1843, involved a challenge to
the 1841 Bankruptcy Act, Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, S Stat. 440, repealed by Act
of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82g, S Stat. 614. The opinion does not state the date upon
which the bankruptcy petition was filed or the dates upon which the debts were
incurred; the opinion of the district court, however, explicitly states that the question
under consideration was whether the 1841 Act could constitutionally be applied to
debts contracted before the passage of the Act. 14 F. Cas. 719, 730 (D. Mo.) (No.
7866), rev'd, 14 F. Cas. 716 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 786S). In Canada Southern, the
mortgage bonds affected by the 1878 arrangement legislation were issued in 1871,
1873, and 187S. 109 U.S. at S28-29. In the Rock Island case, the railroad's § 77
petition was filed on June 7, 1933,294 U.S. at 6S6, approximately three months after
§ 77 was enacted, see Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474. The
opinion of the court of appeals in Rock Island noted that the secured creditors who
were challenging the Act had taken their pledges before the four-month preference
period preceding the date of bankruptcy. Continental ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.Io & Pac. Ry. (Rock Island), 72 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1934), afj'd, 294
U.S. 648 (193S). Hence the creditors must have taken their pledges before the
enactment of § 77.
The situation in the Reiman case is a bit less clear. The bankruptcy petition was
filed on August 3, 1874, 20 F. Cas. 490, 490 (S.D.N. Y. 1874) (No. 11,673), afj'd, 20
F. Cas. SOO (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 187S) (No. 1I,67S), just sL, weeks after the 1867 Bank-
ruptcy Act was amended by the Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178,
182, which provided for composition proceedings. Although the date upon which the
debts of the dissenting creditors were incurred is not specified, given that these
creditiors were owed some $30,000 out of the debtor's total debts of approximately
$160,000, it seems plausible to suppose that their loans were not made in the sL,
weeks before bankruptcy.
163 Furthermore, as has previously been discussed, see supra pp. 988-9S, there is
no sound theoretical basis for a distinction of constitutional dimension between the
rights of secured creditors and those of unsecured creditors.
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Yet in all of these cases, the constitutional issues were viewed
solely as questions of the scope of the bankruptcy power.
The assumption that retroactive bankruptcy legislation
poses constitutional issues separate from and more difficult
than the issues of the substantive scope of the bankruptcy
power may be a product of inattention to the history of bank-
ruptcy legislation. Until the 1898 Act,164 bankruptcy legisla-
tion was not a permanent feature of federal law, but instead
took the form of temporary relief measures adopted in response
to specific financial crises and repealed when the precipitating
cause had passed. 165 As long as bankruptcy acts were seen as
temporary relief measures enacted to alleviate existing eco-
nomic troubles, the idea of nonretroactive bankruptcy legisla-
tion would be almost an absurdity: a newly enacted bank-
ruptcy act that did not apply to preexisting debts could hardly
relieve the plight of existing creditors or debtors. Thus, it is
not surprising that retroactivity does not seem to have been
viewed as a troublesome matter, or even a separate question,
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century cases concerning
the constitutionality of bankruptcy acts.
Even in the case of amendments to existing bankruptcy
legislation, the nineteenth century cases do not appear to have
regarded retroactivity as a question distinct from the issue of
substantive bankruptcy power. Perhaps the most sharply fo-
cused challenge to bankruptcy legislation on the basis of ret-
roactivity concepts involved the curious history of the exemp-
tion provisions of the 1867 Act. 166 As originally enacted, the
Act gave bankrupts the benefit of exemption laws in force in
the state of their domicile in 1864.167 Just after the Civil War,
many states greatly liberalized their exemption laws,168 but
various state courts, and the United States Supreme Court,
164 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at II
U.S.C., in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., and in scattered sections of other titles
(1976); repealed 1978).
165 See C. WARREN, supra note 92, passim. Thus, the 1800 Act, Act of Apr. 4,
1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248, was
by its terms limited to a five-year duration, id. § 64, 2 Stat. at 36, and did not even
survive that long, for it was repealed in 18°3, see Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2Stat.
248. The 1841 Act, Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (effective Feb. I, 1842),
repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82g, 5 Stat. 614, had an even briefer life of just
more than one year. The 1867 Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517
(effective June I, 1867), repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99, held
the record for longevity in the 19th century - II years.
166 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878,
ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
167 ld. § 14, 14 Stat. at 522.
168 See C. WARREN, supra note 92, at 1I0.
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held that it would violate the contracts clause for the states to
apply their expanded exemption laws to debts incurred before
the enactment of those laws. 169 Despite the bar on action by
the states, in 1872 Congress amended the 1867 Bankruptcy
Act to give bankrupts the benefit of exemption laws in force
in the state of their domicile in 1871. 170 Congress adopted a
further clarifying amendment in 1873171 to make explicit that
bankrupts were to have the benefit of the exemption laws on
the books in 1871 - even though those laws had been held
invalid under the contracts clause as state legislation - and
that such exemptions should be available even as against an-
tecedent debts and even as against judicial liens previously
acquired on the property.
Thus, the amendments to the 1867 Act provide a clear
instance of a congressional exercise of the bankruptcy power
that retroactively impaired the rights of creditors, including
creditors holding judicial liens,l72 in precisely the situation in
which the Supreme Court had held that such retroactive leg-
islation, when adopted by the states, violated the constitutional
rights of creditors. Moreover, the situation was not one in
which Congress enacted a bankruptcy statute and applied it
to debts contracted at a time when no bankruptcy act was in
force. Rather, it was a situation in which Congress sought to
give retroactive force to an amendment to existing bankruptcy
legislation in circumstances in which creditors might plausibJy
claim to have relied on the previous legislation. Nevertheless,
although no case challenging the 1872 or 1873 amendments
reached the Supreme Court, the decisions of the lower federal
courts generally indicated that the retroactive feature of the
amendments was not constitutionally problematic, on the
ground that the bankruptcy power necessarily entails the
power retroactively to impair contractual obligations and re-
lated liens. 173
169 See Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (IS Wall.) 610 (1872); Jones v. Brandon, 48 Ga.
593 (1873); The Homestead Cases, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 266 (1872).
170 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 339, 17 Stat. 334, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878,
ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
171 Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 235, 17 Stat. 577, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878,
ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
172 See In re Smith, 22 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1876) (No. 12,996), aff'g,
22 F. Cas. 399 (N.D. Ga. 1873) (No. 12,986); In re Jordan, 13 F. Cas. 1079, 1080
(\V.D.N.C. 1873) (No. 7514); In re Kean, 14 F. Cas. 157, 157 (\V.D. Va. 1873) (No.
7630).
173 In re Smith, 22 F. Cas. 413, 414 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1876) (No. 12,996), aff'g 22
F. Cas. 399 (N.D. Ga. 1873) (No. 12,986); In re Jordan, 13 F. Cas. 1079, 1080
(\V.D.N.C. 1873) (No. 7514); In re Kean, 14 F. Cas. 157, 157 (W.D. Va. 1873) (No.
7630); In re Volger, 28 F. Cas. 1248, 1250 (\V.D.N.C. 1873) (No. 16,986); In re
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Thus, the nineteenth and early twentieth century bank-
ruptcy cases belie the assertion in Security Industrial Bank
that retroactive bankruptcy legislation impairing secured cred-
itors' rights poses substantial fifth amendment problems. Only
the Radford case supports the view that the fifth amendment
operates as an independent source of limitations on retroactive
application of the bankruptcy power, and Radford itself
marked a radical and unexplained shift in the analysis of the
relationship between the bankruptcy clause and the fifth
amendment. 174 Given that Radford's specific application of
fifth amendment retroactivity principles was essentially over-
ruled by the subsequent Frazier-Lemke Act cases, 175 one might
suggest that Radford's analytic assumptions should also be
regarded as little more than a sport.
2. The Security Industrial Bank Analysis. - Nevertheless,
in light of Security Industrial Bank, it appears that the Su-
preme Court will continue to accept at least the general prin-
. ciple for which Radford stands - that the fifth amendment
may impose some limitations on the retroactive application of
bankruptcy legislation - although the Court's reasons for
doing so are not entirely clear. It is not, however, particularly
easy to derive from Security Industrial Bank any useful prin-
ciples for delineating those limitations. The Court's analysis
seems to comprise two steps. First, Justice Rehnquist noted
that a creditor's security interest in personal property of the
debtor is recognized as a property interest under the relevant
state law,176 and observed that section 522(f)'s invalidation of
Wyllie, 30 F. Cas. 733, 737 (W.D. Va. 1872) (No. 18,II2) (dictum). There appears
to be only one case, In re Dillard, 7 F. Cas. 703 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1873) (No. 3912),
that ruled that the 1873 Act would be invalid on fifth amendment principles if applied
retroactively. The case therefore limited the Act to prospective application, id. at
706.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Security Industrial Bank completely overlooks the
cases dealing with the 1873 amendment, notwithstanding the fact that, to the ~xtent
that both the 1873 amendment and § 522(f) of the new Bankruptcy Code invalidated
judicial liens on exempt property, the issues presented by the two provisions were
identical.
174 One might seek to explain the Radford shift on the ground that the 19th
century bankruptcy cases were decided before Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), the first decision stating that a nonappropriative regulatory measure
might violate the takings clause, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 440-42 (1978). The problem with this explanation is that
the Rock Island case, decided 13 years after Pennsylvania Coal, reaffirmed the analysis
applied in the pre-Radford cases. See supra p. 1004. Moreover, Pennsylvania Coal
was not even cited in Radford, and Justice Brandeis, the author of Radford" dissented
in Pennsylvania Coal, see 260 U.S. at 416-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
175 See supra pp. 980-81 & note 54.
176 103 S. Ct. at 4II n.6.
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such a security interest amounts to a "complete destruction of
the property right of the secured party." 177 Accordingly, the
Court regarded cases involving restrictions on only "some but
not all of the 'bundle of rights' which comprise the 'property'
in question" to be largely irrelevant. 178 Second, Justice Rehn-
quist considered the government's contention that, because the
security interests invalidated by section 522(f) were likely to
be used principally as a bargaining lever against the debtor
rather than as a source of repayment of the debt, retroactive
application of section 522(f) did not violate the takings
clause. 179 The opinion states that, although this argument
"cannot be dismissed out of. hand," it is belied by the state
law categorization of the security interests as property, a cat-
egorization on which takings analysis must rely.180 Both steps
in this analysis are flawed.
(a) Complete Versus Partial Destructions of Property
Rights. - The key to Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Security
Industrial Bank seems to be the assertion that the case in-
volved a complete destruction of a property interest. Yet an
analysis based upon the distinction between complete and par-
tial destructions of property interests quickly redounds to cir-
cularity, for the distinction depends entirely on the definition
of the property interests involved. 181 In Security Industrial
Bank, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v. City ofNew York - which upheld the application
of New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law to prevent
construction of an office tower atop Grand Central Station182
- on the ground that the legislation in the earlier case only
partly impaired the owner's rights in the parcel of real estate
affected. 183 Yet Penn Central could just as well be described
as a case in which the value of the air rights above the existing
parcel were completely or nearly completely destroyed. 184 Sim-
ilarly, a zoning law imposing setback requirements can be
described either as a partial impairment of the owner's rights
177 Id. at 4II.
178 Id. (referring to Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978».
179 Id. at 412.
180Id.
181 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419-20 (1922) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. II6S, II92-93 (1967);
Sa.x, Takings and tlte Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60 (1964).
182 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
183 SeCllrity Indus. Bank, 103 S. Ct. at 411.
184 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31.
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in the entire parcel or as an essentially total destruction of the
value of the portion on which construction is prohibited.
The attempt to use the distinction between complete and
partial destructions as the key to the analysis of the constitu-
tionality of retroactive legislation proves no more successful in
explaining the result reached in Security Industrial Bank itself.
Justice Rehnquist's characterization of section 522(f) as a mea-
sure that completely destroyed the secured creditor's property
right depends entirely on an arbitrary definition of the scope
of the property interest involved. In the first place, section
522(f) applies only in bankruptcy proceedings; hence the se-
cured creditor's lien remains fully effective in other contexts.
Moreover, section 522(f) invalidates security interests only in
certain property specified by type and value,185 and thus would
effect only a partial invalidation of the security interest of a
creditor holding a lien on a more extensive set of collateral.
Nothing in the Court's opinion, however, suggests that the
constitutional issue was seen to be limited to creditors holding
liens only on property covered by section 522(f).
The most serious flaw in Justice Rehnquist's attempt to
apply the distinction between complete and partial destructions
in Security Industrial Bank is that, even if all of the secured
creditor's collateral were affected by section 522(f), the creditor
would retain an unsecured claim against the debtor and there-
fore would have an interest, in common with other unsecured
creditors, in all of the debtor's nonexempt property. As has
been argued above,186 there is no sound basis for contending
that the interest of unsecured creditors in the debtor's estate
as a whole is any less of a property interest than is the interest
of secured creditors in their specific collateral. Thus, if the
secured creditor's "property" interest is properly viewed as his
total claim against the debtor's assets, even complete invali-
dation of the creditor's lien does not effect a complete destruc-
tion of his property interest.
(b) Nature of Property Interests Destroyed. - The second
step of the analysis in Security Industrial Bank is even less
consistent with established takings clause jurisprudence than
is the first step. The opinion seems to suggest that, because
state law categorizes the security interests in question as prop-
erty interests, it is irrelevant to the takings analysis that the
only value of the security interest to the creditor may be in
coercing the debtor into a reaffirmation of the debt by threat-
185 See Bankruptcy Code § 522(b), (d), (f), II U.S.C. § 522(b), (d), (f) (Supp. V
1981).
186 See supra pp. 988-95.
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ening to deprive the debtor of his household furnishings. 187
There is, however, nothing in takings clause jurisprudence
suggesting that the mere state law categorization of an interest
as property obviates the need to consider whether the property
interest regulated or destroyed is one that imposes inordinate
harms on others. To the contrary, it is well established that
such an inquiry is often decisive in takings analysis. 18s
Thus, taken literally, the analysis of Security Industrial
Bank is neither consistent with sound takings clause analysis
nor particularly helpful in specifying the permissible limits of
retroactive bankruptcy legislation. Accordingly, I now turn to
the consideration of a more satisfactory analytic framework,
with which the result, though not the language, of Security
Industrial Bank is entirely consistent.
B. An Alternative Approach
I. The Relationship Between the Takings Clause and the
Due Process Clause. - To begin with, it is worth noting that
constitutional constraints on retroactive legislation need not be
attributed to the takings clause. Rather, constitutional retroac-
tivity principles are often traced to the due process clause. In
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining CO.,189 for example, the Su-
preme Court analyzed solely as a matter of due process a
challenge to the retroactive aspect of a federal statute requiring
mine owners to compensate former employees afflicted by
black lung disease. 19o
Indeed, until the 1920'S, it would have been virtually im-
possible to base a viable challenge to retroactive application
187 See 103 s. Ct. at 412.
188 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding safety
ordinance banning excavations below water table); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928) (upholding statute requiring destruction of cedar trees harboring pest fatal to
nearby apple trees); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding law
prohibiting operation of brickyard, on ground of interference with enjoyment of
neighboring owners' lands). See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 144-45 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing "noxious
use" theory of takings clause).
189 428 U.S. I (1976).
190 See id. at 16-17. Commentators have generally noted that the due process
retroactivity test turns on a flexible balancing test, which considers such factors as
the strength of the public interest served by the challenged statute, the need for
retroactive application in order to achieve the purposes of the statute, the extent of
the impairment of preenactment rights, and the extent to which parties have reason-
ably and legitimately relied on the preenactment system of legal rules. See Hochman,
The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 lIARv. L.
REv. 692 (1960); Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroac-
tive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1960).
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of a bankruptcy statute on the takings clause. At the time
when the takings clause was regarded to be applicable only to
governmental action that involved an actual appropriation or
physical invasion of property,191 most forms of harm to preex-
isting private economic interests that resulted from otherwise
valid exercises of governmental power would not have been
seen to raise problems under the takings clause, although non-
appropriative retroactive legislation might have been consid-
ered invalid under the due process clause. 192 Since the time
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,193 however, it has been
a part of our constitutional theory that any sort of govern-
mental regulation, if it "goes too far,"194 may amount to a
taking for which compensation must be provided. Thus, given
a sufficiently broad conception of property, virtually any chal-
lenge to retroactive legislation that adversely affects economic
interests can now be phrased as a matter of regulatory takings
law.
The choice between the takings clause locution and the due
process formulation, however, probably reflects only factual
differences concerning the challenged legislation rather than
any significant difference in the appropriate analysis. The
effect of regulatory legislation on private economic interests
can be alleviated in two ways: by limiting the legislation to
prospective effect or by paying compensation for the impair-
ment of preexisting interests. In cases that involve statutes
regulating the use of land - which by their very nature cannot
be limited to truly prospective effect195 - the only ameliorative
option is the payment of compensation, and hence the takings
clause description seems apt. On the other hand, in cases
involving legislation such as the statute in Turner Elkhorn
Mining, which required mine owners to pay benefits to former
employees afflicted by black lung disease, a requirement of
compensation would render pointless the legislation imposing
a burden on private economic interests. Thus, when the only
practical ameliorative option is to limit a measure to prospec-
tive application, the question of the measure's constitutionality
is more likely to be phrased as a due process retroactivity issue
than as a takings issue. In a wide variety of cases, however,
191 E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, I23 U.S. 623, 668-69 (I887); Transportation Co. v.
City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (I878).
192 See Hochman, supra note I90, at 694 & n.I5.
193 260 U.S. 393 (I922).
194 Id. at 4I5.
195 See supra note 59.
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either formulation will be available, and nothing will turn on
the choice of analytic reference. 196
The Radford case197 itself illustrates the irrelevance of the
choice between the takings clause and the due process clause
in the analysis of retroactive legislation. Although courts and
commentators generally have viewed Radford as a takings
clause decision,198 the Radford opinion belies the suggestion
that the Supreme Court saw the case solely as a takings
clause matter. Justice Brandeis' opinion does not actually cite
any takings clause cases,199 and there are passages in the
opinion suggesting that the determinative precedents were con-
tracts clause cases200 and due process cases. 201 Indeed, the
only explicit reference to the takings clause in Radford comes
in the opinion's concluding sentences,202 which may well be
more a matter of rhetorical flourish than constitutional analy-
sis. After all, any opinion holding economic legislation uncon-
stitutional under the due process clause can be made to sound
a bit more statesmanlike by the suggestion that the legislature
is free to pursue the objectives of the legislation provided it is
willing to pay the piper.
2. Core Expectations. - Whether one prefers the takings
clause locution or the due process formulation, the core of the
analysis of the constitutionality of retroactive legislation should
196 In particular, it must be kept in mind that the possibility that due process or
takings clause principles might limit the permissibility of retroactive alterations of
bankruptcy law does not depend upon, or lend any support to, the notion that secured
creditors' "property" rights are different, as a constitutional matter, from unsecured
creditors' "contractual" claims. In this Article's discussion of the constitutional prin-
ciples applicable to the substance of prospective bankruptcy legislation, the argument
that there is a difference of constitutional dimension between the rights of secured
creditors and those of unsecured creditors has been considered and rejected. See supra
pp. 988-<)5. That discussion is equally applicable in the present setting of the con-
stitutionality of retroactive changes in bankruptcy law. Both secured and unsecured
creditors have "property" rights that could conceivably be entitled to protection against
retroactive application of legislation effecting extreme, adverse changes of their rights
in bankruptcy, whether one wishes to locate the source of retroactivity principles in
the due process clause or in the takings clause.
197 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
198 See sources cited supra note 25.
199 There is, for example, no mention of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922). Counsel for the bank in Radford also appears to have argued for
the unconstitutionality of the Fra2ier-Lemke Act solely on the bases of the bankruptcy
clause, see 295 U.S. at 558-60, and the due process clause, see id. at 561.
200 See 295 U.S. at 581, 597-<)8 (discussing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934».
201 See id. at 601 (citing Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139 (1913».
202 ld. at 601-02, quoted q.t supra note 25.
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be the concern with disruption of the settled expectations of
private parties. For example, in one of the most important
recent examinations of the theoretical foundations of the tak-
ings clause, Professor Michelman suggests that the clause can
be viewed as a provision designed to ensure that parties can
rely on their economic expectations to the extent necessary to
make productive activity worthwhile. 203 Similarly, in one of
the Supreme Court's recent takings clause decisions, Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v. City of New York,204 the Court
indicated that one of the major factors in determining whether
a taking has occurred is "the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions."205 Proper analysis of retroactivity problems therefore
turns largely on two issues: the extent to which the challenged
legislation disrupts expectations and the legitimacy of those
expectations.
It is sometimes suggested that the question of the extent to
which a given statute disrupts legitimate expectations raises a
purely quantitative inquiry. For example, in the takings con-
text, the diminution of value test,206 which is traceable to
Justice Holmes' suggestion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
that a regulatory measure may be held a taking "if [the] reg-
ulation goes too far," 207 is often understood to ask how much
the value of the property in question has been diminished by
the challenged regulation. It is, however, more useful to view
the question of the extent of disruption of expectations as a
qualitative inquiry. For example, in some land use regulation
cases the focus is not so much on the extent of the loss im-
posed, but on whether there are any remaining profitable uses
for the land as regulated. 208 This residuum or remaining-
feasible-use approach209 seems to rest on the notion that there
are certain core expectations involved in the ownership of land
and in other economic activity and that it is these core expec-
tations that are entitled to constitutional protection against
retroactive disruption. The qualitative view seems to have
played a decisive role in the Supreme Court's decision in Penn
203 Michelman, supra note 181, at 1202-26.
204 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
205 Id. at 124.
206 See Michelman, supra note 181, at IIg0-93; Sax, supra note 181, at 41-46.
207 260 U.S. at 415.
208 See, e.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587
(1938).
209 For discussion of the residuum test, see Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural
Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REv. 201, 227-28, 232-33
(1974); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1057, 1063-64 (1980).
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Central. Noting that the ordinance permitted Penn Central to
continue to use Grand Central Station as it had been used
since its construction and that this remaining use preserved
Penn Central's opportunity to earn a reasonable return on its
investment, the Court stated that "the law does not interfere
with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expec-
tation concerning the use of the parcel."210
The usefulness of core expectations analysis to retroactivity
problems depends, of course, on the ability to specify the
relevant core or primary expectations. An effort to identify
the core expectations embodied in the general concept of prop-
erty may well be futile and, in any event, is beyond the scope
of this Article. By limiting the inquiry to the context of se-
cured creditors' rights in bankruptcy, however, one can de-
velop a satisfactory analysis of the retroactivity issue.
The essential function of security for debts is the allocation
of risk. 211 A secured creditor bargains for the right to limit
his exposure to the general business risks of his debtor's en-
terprise, and, in return, charges a lower rate of interest or
makes loans that would not otherwise be available to the
debtor. This allocation of risk is implemented in our legal
system by giving the secured creditor a prior claim against
specific assets of the debtor; as has been noted above,212 how-
ever, this mechanism is perhaps best viewed as simply a con-
venient, but not logically essential, means of allocating to other
creditors or investors a larger portion of the risk of a deterio-
ration in the debtor's earning capacity.213 It seems plausible,
therefore, that this allocation of risk - the secured creditor's
210 438 U.S. at 136.
211 See Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors,
88 YALE L.J. II43 (1979).
212 See supra pp. 993-94.
213 In many contexts other than the matter of supposed constitutional protections
of secured creditors' rights, the law has not been blind to the difference between the
essential function of security devices and the means by which that function is accom-
plished. For example, the development of the equity of redemption in mortgage law,
see 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY §§
7-16 (8th ed. 1928), is a striking instance of the ability of the courts to disregard the
consequences of the property law forms by which security devices were implemented
in an effort to achieve more just results consistent with the central functions of the
arrangements.
Other illustrations are provided by the long-established doctrine that parol evidence
may be used to show that a bill of sale in absolute form was intended as a security
device, see U.C.C. § 9-203 comment 4 (1977), and by various aspects of article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, such as the insistence that title concepts are irrelevant
in determining the rights of parties to security arrangements, id. § 9-202, and the
inclusion \vithin the coverage of article 9 of any arrangement, however described or
implemented, that has the effect of a security arrangement, id. § 9-102.
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right to priority over other creditors and investors - should
be regarded for constitutional purposes as the core of the
secured creditor's expectations.
Accordingly, retroactive application of a provision of bank-
ruptcy law that impairs the risk allocation function of security
arrangements might raise substantial constitutional questions.
That was precisely the problem in Security Industrial Bank:
by invalidating liens, section 522(f) frustrates the secured cred-
itor's effort to acquire priority for his claim by obtaining a
security interest in the debtor's property. It is this disruption
of the secured creditor's core expectations, and not the notion
of a supposed distinction between complete and partial de-
structions of property interests, that might have proved the
starting point for a sound analysis in Security Industrial Bank.
3. Legitimacy of Expectations. - The second aspect of a
proper analysis of retroactivity problems is the inquiry into the
legitimacy of the expectations disrupted. For example, land
use regulations that restrict the use of property so severely that
they destroy nearly all of its value have often been upheld
against takings clause attack on grounds analogous to the
nuisance concept that no one is entitled to use his property in
a way that harms others. 214 Distinguishing, at a very general
level, between legitimate and illegitimate expectations is, to be
sure, no easy task. 2l5 Nonetheless, the imprecision of analysis
attributable to the need to weigh genuinely relevant factors is
certainly preferable to the false precision that results from
basing the analysis on arbitrary concepts of property rights.
Moreover, by focusing on the specific area of bankruptcy leg-
islation, one can identify a useful approach to the analysis of
legitimacy of expectations. In the first place, nothing in either
Security Industrial Bank or Radford purports to overrule the
pre-Radford cases that so readily upheld retroactive bank-
ruptcy legislation impairing the rights of both secured and
unsecured creditors. Thus, the recognition that we have a
longstanding tradition of upholding the retroactive application
214 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-<)6 (1962)
(regulation of dredging and pit excavations, on ground of public safety); Hadacheck
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408 (1915) (prohibition of use of property for brickyard
that might cause sickness and discomfort to neighboring residents); see also Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 144-45 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the noxious use test). See generally Dunham, Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
SUP. CT. REv. 63, 80 (proposing distinction between regulation designed to prevent
infliction of harms and regulation designed to obtain public benefits).
215 For critical discussion of the noxious use and prevention-of-harms tests in
takings law, see Michelman, supra note 181, at II96-20I, 1235-45; Sax, supra note
181, at 48-50.
1983] FIFTH AMENDMENT AND BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE 1027
of new or amended bankruptcy statutes suggests that a creditor
who contends that retroactive application of a change in the
bankruptcy law would disrupt his legitimate expectations in a
manner that would violate the Constitution should bear a very
heavy burden of persuasion. 216 Moreover, the evolution of
bankruptcy legislation has been marked by an increasing rec-
ognition of the appropriate role of government in limiting
certain aspects of creditors' rights against the debtor. Accord-
ingly, as the creditors' rights at issue approach areas that have
been marked as proper spheres of restriction by bankruptcy
legislation, the less compelling are the creditors' claims of le-
gitimate reliance.
Consider the disruption of expectations effected by the stat-
ute involved in Security Industrial Bank. The central prin-
ciple of straight bankruptcy is that, to enable the debtor to
make a fresh start, the government may limit the extent to
which a debtor's assets will be devoted to the satisfaction of
his creditors' claims.217 Before the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy law generally allowed otherwise
valid liens to be enforced against exempt property.218 This
consideration may suggest that there is nothing illegitimate
about a secured creditor's expectation that his priority could
be established even through a mechanism that might impair
the debtor's exemptions. Nonetheless, the theory of section
522(f) is that a lender who takes a non-purchase-money se-
curity interest in property such as a consumer's household
goods probably does not actually anticipate that his security
interest will have any substantial economic value as a priority
mechanism, but hopes instead to be able to use the threat of
repossession to coerce the debtor into agreeing to favorable
settlements or reaffirmation agreements. 219 Assuming that
Congress accurately perceived the mischief that section 522(f)
was designed to avoid, retroactive application of that provision
would disrupt only the lender's expectation of being able to
frustrate the fresh start policy. Certainly the sphere of legiti-
mate expectations does not extend to the hope of being able
216 Cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971) (whether judicial
decision overruling precedent should be given retroactive effect depends in part on
whether decision was foreshadowed); Michelman, supra note 181, at 1240-41 (dis-
cussing theory that compensation is not required if society forewarns investor of
possibility of destruction of his investment).
217 See supra p. 1001.
218 See COLLIER, supra note 7, 11 522.27, at 522-66 n.l; COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
11 6.12, at 863 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
219 See H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 8, at 127, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6088.
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to manipulate normally sanctioned legal devices in order to
frustrate established governmental policy. Therefore, even the
result in Security Industrial Bank may have been wrong. 220
C. Retroactive Application of Legislation Authorizing Interim
Restraint of Secured Creditors'Rights
The analysis developed above would readily dispose of the
constitutional issues that would be posed if Congress chose to
abandon the adequate protection model of the new Bankruptcy
Code and adopted legislation, with retroactive application,
authorizing the type of impairment of secured creditors' rights
that was involved in Yale Express. 221 In the first place, an
order of the sort involved in Yale Express would not signifi-
cantly disrupt the core expectation of a secured creditor - the
expectation that his security interest will enable him to imple-
ment the allocation of risk for which he has bargained. No
one in Yale Express denied that the secured creditor was en-
titled to priority over other claimants. Rather, mechanisms
were devised to provide a substantial degree of assurance that
the contractual risk allocation that the security interest was
designed to implement would be preserved even if the specific
collateral were not. If the reorganization succeeded, the cred-
itor's claim was to be treated in the plan as a secured claim
to the extent of the value of the collateral at the inception of
the proceedings. 222 Even if the reorganization effort failed and
the debtor's assets were liquidated, it appears that the creditor
was to be given a priority claim for the amount of depreciation
of the collateral.223 To be sure, if the court's prediction of the
220 On the other hand, one might argue that § 522(f) may disrupt legitimate
expectations and that other mechanisms were available to Congress to deal more
precisely with only those instances in which security interests in exempt property were
being used for illegitimate purposes. Thus, § 722 of the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C.
§ 722 (Supp. v 1981), would permit the debtor to redeem exempt property subject to
a security interest by paying the creditor the fair market value of the property, and
§ 524(C)-{d), II U.S.C. § 524(C)-{d) (Supp. v 1981), severely restricts the creditor's
ability to obtain reaffirmation agreements.
221 In re Yale Express Sys., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967). An attempt to analyze
the problem under the language of Security Industrial Bank would seem to be wholly
inconclusive since such legislation would not entirely invalidate the secured creditor's
lien. An attempt to apply some quantitative version of the diminution test, see supra
p. 1024, would lead to a fruitless attempt to specify the point at which depreciation
in the value of the secured creditor's collateral becomes constitutionally problematic.
For reasons discussed in Part I, see supra pp. 995-97, identifying the requirement of
preservation of the value of collateral as the critical point in a quantitative analysis
would be wholly arbitrary.
222 See 384 F.2d at 992.
223 See id.
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likelihood of a successful reorganization had been incorrect,
the secured creditor's priority position might have been im-
paired. The takings clause, however, does not provide insur-
ance against the possibility of harm to private economic inter-
ests that results from the inevitable fallibility of governmental
decisionmakers. 224
Retroactive application of bankruptcy legislation authoriz-
ing the type of impairment of secured creditors' rights that
was involved in Yale Express would, of course, disrupt certain
expectations of secured creditors - specifically, the expectation
that the creditor will have the power to seize his collateral
upon the debtor's default in order to protect the limitation of
risk for which he has bargained. Yet if the property involved
is essential to any effort to effect a reorganization, the secured
creditor's expectation of being able to seize the property is
tantamount to an expectation of being able to decide whether
the debtor should be permitted to attempt a reorganization.
The development of bankruptcy legislation has been marked
by an increasing recognition of the desirability of preserving
the going concern value of enterprises. 225 A creditor's expec-
tation of being given veto power over the continued expansion
of the means through which this objective of the bankruptcy
system is pursued would certainly not rank high on the scale
of legitimate expectations.
Moreover, looking to analogies drawn from areas other
than bankruptcy law, one can find ample support for denying
constitutional protection to a secured creditor's expectation of
being given unilateral authority to decide whether to sacrifice
the prospect of salvaging going concern values in order to
ensure absolute protection of his own interests. In a wide
variety of contexts, the legal system has developed significant
limitations on the extent to which contractual agreements may
give one party the authority to make decisions affecting the
interests of others solely on the basis of his own interests. For
example, the development of the concepts of unconscionability
and good faith performance in the law of contracts can be
seen as a manifestation of the concern with contractual agree-
ments that permit one party to disregard entirely the interests
224 See Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 125 (1922)
(person who sustains damages caused by government agency's tortious activity cannot
avoid sovereign immunity bar by contending that the destruction of his property
constitutes a taking). Although the loss of use of real estate caused by repeated low-
altitude flights of military aircraft may be a compensable taking, United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), no one would suppose that the complete destruction of
a house caused by the crash of a military aircraft would be a taking.
225 See supra pp. 1001-05.
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of another party in making decisions concerning the contrac-
tual relationship.226 Much the same concern can be seen in
developments in corporate law imposing fiduciary duties on
majority stockholders that restrain their ability to take action
prejudicial to the interests of minority stockholders. 227 In
short, the secured creditor's contractual right to foreclose on
the collateral to protect his own interests at the expense of
destroying the going concern values from which other creditors
might be paid is precisely the sort of contractual arrangement
that in many areas of the law has been considered particularly
troublesome. Thus, there is little reason to believe that such
a contractual right is constitutionally immune from retroactive
abrogation.
Although the analysis in Security Industrial Bank reflects
a somewhat wooden view of takings clause and property con-
cepts, there is ample support in other cases for a more flexible
analysis of the constitutionality of retroactive bankruptcy leg-
islation. Such an analysis would focus on the extent of dis-
ruption of core expectations and the legitimacy of the expec-
tations disrupted. Given that the outcome of Security
Industrial Bank is in fact consistent with such an approach,
the language of the opinion need not be viewed to preclude
the application of an analysis of the sort suggested in this
Article in future cases involving retroactive bankruptcy legis-
lation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered specific issues concerning the
impairment of secured creditors' rights in reorganization pro-
ceedings in order to provide a framework for consideration of
the more general issue of the relationship between the bank-
ruptcy clause and the due process and takings clauses of the
fifth amendment. The conclusion must be that Justice Bran-
deis' famous statement in the Radford case that "[t]he bank-
ruptcy power ... is subject to the Fifth Amendment,"228 a
226 See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§§ 205, 208 (1979); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 239-52 (1968).
227 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Similarly, the
law of liability insurance has in recent decades moved toward the position that, if an
insurance contract gives the insurer the right to decide whether to settle or to litigate
a claim against the insured, the insurer must take account of the interests of the
insured in making that decision. See 14 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§§ 51.1-.18 (M. Rhodes rev. 2d ed. 1982).
228 295 U.S. at 589.
I983] FIFTH AMENDMENT AND BANKRUPTCY CLAUSE 1°31
statement that at first blush seems to be such a truism, is in
fact false. The only significant constitutional restraint on the
substance of purely prospective bankruptcy legislation is the
bankruptcy clause itself. Even in the context of retroactive
application of bankruptcy legislation, the effort to deduce con-
trolling principles from general principles about property rights
- as suggested by the language of Security Industrial Bank
- proves far less successful than an approach that draws more
heavily on bankruptcy principles in considering whether legit-
imate expectations are disrupted.
One of the most intriguing observations to be drawn from
a study of the early cases in which the constitutionality of
bankruptcy legislation was challenged is the remarkable trans-
formation that has occurred in the style and language of con-
stitutional analysis. No longer does one find challenges to the
constitutionality of bankruptcy legislation phrased as conten-
tions that the measure in question is not "a law on the subject
of bankruptcy." Rather, since the time of Radford, the inquiry
has shifted to the question whether the act at issue takes
property rights in violation of general principles sought to be
deduced from a theory of the takings clause.
Yet the attempt to use general fifth amendment concepts
as a source for deriving specific principles limiting the bank-
ruptcy power has led only to arbitrary and unsatisfactory
results. Thus, there may have been far more wisdom than is
now generally recognized in the concentration of nineteenth
century lawyers and judges on specifying the scope of the
powers implicit in the constitutional grant to Congress of au-
thority over the subject of bankruptcies. Indeed, there may
well be lessons here that extend beyond the subject of bank-
ruptcy, for the shift of emphasis from the bankruptcy clause
to the fifth amendment may be but one manifestation of the
abandonment of any serious effort to regard government (fed-
eral or state) as having only specific granted powers whose
scope is limited by the terms of the explicit or implicit grant,
rather than as possessing plenary powers over all human en-
deavors, restricted only by specific limiting principles. That
larger issue, however, is a matter for another day.
